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Article 6

.,
Book Reviews

Shakespeare and the Jews by James Shapiro. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1996. Pp. ix + 317. $29.95.

The announced subject of James Shapiro's splendid new book is "what
Shakespeare and his contemporaries thought about Jews" (1), but it is
equally enlightening on the development of the Myth of Englishness and
"what it meant to be English during a period marked by social, religious,
and political instability" (57). Deeply influenced by the new historicism,
Shapiro emphasizes the cultural power of formative narrative for example
the gradually solidifying stories of the expulsion of the Jews in 1290 and
their presumptive "readmission" in 1656; yet by insisting on the significance
of religion as a category of analysis, he expands new historicism's limited
trinity of race, class, and gender, which tends to ignore a fundamental element of English thought in the early modern period. Based on an enormous
amount of scholarship both primary and secondary, the book illuminates
English history and cultural attitudes as the same time that it proposes a
provocative new reading of The Merchant of Venice and ranges through literature from Marlowe to Maria Edgeworth.
Before turning to Shakespeare Shapiro describes a culture in which all
forms of difference-Catholic/Protestant, nation/race, Jewish/Christian,
even male/female-were contested and in constant danger of collapse. As
the Spanish had found following the forced conversion of their Jewish populations, it is impossible to determine the truth of assertions of personal belief;
one result was "false Jews and counterfeit Christians." Following the 1492
expulsion of the Jews from Spain, small Marrano communities were established in England, and contrary to conventional wisdom, "there were Jews in
Shakespeare's England, though probably never more than a couple of hundred at any given time." (For a fuller discussion see David Katz, The Jews in
the History of England [Oxford, 1994J, to whom Shapiro acknowledges his
debts, though he differs with Katz over how to describe the anomalous status of the Jews in the later seventeenth century.) Given these limited numbers, the question of Jewish difference-racial, religious, national, even
sexual (one accusation was that Jewish men menstruated)-was surprisingly
"hot," debated in sermons and in parliament. Even the natives of the new
world were brought into this discussion, some explorers alleging that they
were the lost tribes, their incomprehenSible language a form of Hebrew.
One reason for the obsessive interest in the Jews was that English Protestants saw themselves as a newer version of God's elect: to define Englishness
was necessarily to refer to Jewishness. At the same time, traditional accusations of economic, theological and physical crimes ascribed to Jews continued to circulate. In particular, early modern English writers were prone to
consider ritual murder "the Jewish crime," in the words of Samuel Purchas.
Some of Shapiro's most interesting speculations concern the psychological
reasons for the continuing resonance of this libeL He proposes, among other
things, that the belief that Jews abducted and murdered children was useful
in explaining the disappearance of abandoned children, just as accusations of
villainous usury projected English anxiety about the growth of economic exploitation after 1571, when the taking of interest up to 10% became legal.
Furthermore, the allegation that Jews committed ritual murder to obtain
f
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blood for their passover bread came uncomfortably close to Protestant England's discomfort over their "own Catholic and therefore cannibalistic past"
(110).
Peculiar to England was an additional accusation that before murdering
abducted male children the Jews circumcised them. While modern readers
may instinctively reach for psychological interpretations, Shapiro demonstrates convincingly that for post-Reformation Elizabethans it was the theological implications, especially of Paul's "cryptic remarks" on circumcision,
that determined the meaning of this ritual and incidentally "had an imlneasurable impact on Elizabethan conceptions of Jews" (117). In brief, English
Protestants equated circumcision with the old laIN and its supersession by
faith; the proper circumcision for Christians \vas instead inward and of the
heart. For literary critics no doubt the most suggestive section of Shapiro's
book is that in which he extends this finding into a reading of The Merchant
o/Venice.
\A/hen Shylock first proposes to exact a pound of Antonio's flesh, "to be
cut off and taken" in that part of Antonio's body that best "pleaseth" him, he
does not further clarify the bodily location. Indeed, it is not until the courtroom scene that Shylock asserts his intention to cut from a spot nearest Antanio's heart. But for an Elizabethan, Shapiro claims, the threat to cut a
pound of Antonio's flesh would have suggested emasculation. Not only is
"flesh" the consistent sixteenth-century term for penis (Shapiro cites the Geneva Bible), but in one of Shakespeare's sources, Alexander Silvayn's The Or~
ator, the Jew's intention to castrate is overt, as is the Christian's in a related
anecdote that reverses the parties, recounted in Gregorio Leti's Life of Pope
Shtus the Fifth. Shylock's decision to cut from Antonio's heart is, then, "the
height of the literalism that informs all of his actions," as he is cutting his
Christian adversary "in that part of the body where the Christians believe
themselves to be truly circumcised: the heart" (127). Antonio's demand that
Shylock become a Christian is a metaphorical "uncircumcision": Antonio and
Shylock "to the last seek out ... symbolic acts that convert their adversary
into their own kind" (130).
The Merchant of Venice has "emerged as a touchstone of cultural identification" (10) and Shylock as the prototypical figure of Renaissance Jewishness
(see John Gross, Shylock: A Legend and Its Legacy [New York, 1992]). Nevertheless, Shapiro suggests, H was the economic strength of other resident
aliens-French, Dutch, Italian, Portuguese-rather than Jewish usury, that
really worried Londoners in the period of The Merchant of Venice. Civic authorities undertook a full census of aliens in 1593, and there was a riot upon
the strangers" (187) in 1595, not long before Merchant 0/ Venice was produced. In fact, what makes Shylock vulnerable to Portia's legal sleight-ofhand is the law against resident aliens: as so often happens, the play
"reproduces the practice of translating anti-alien into anti-Jewish sentiment"
(189). And Shapiro is not hesitant about showing how such sentiment persists. Some for whom Shakespeare's age represents a time of pristine
"Englishness" have objected vigorously to Jewish scholars who trespass "on
the banks of the Avon," beginning with Israel Gollancz, the first Jewish professor of English literature in England and continuing, in one recent and vigorously anti-semitic list, through Stephen Greenblatt (Eliot Baker, Bardolalry
II
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[1992], cited by Shapiro, 81). Shapiro sees such excesses as a manifestation of
the "cultural anxieties that continue to circulate ... around the twin poles of
'Shakespeare' and the 'Jews'" (83), though he also points out that the English
of Shakespeare's own period, unlike the Spanish, never were guilty of pogroms, forced conversions, inquisition or other violence against the n011Christians in their midst.
The latter parts of Shapiro's book trace the repeated attempts, especially in
the Whitehall conference of 1655 and the debate over the "Jew Bill" of 1753,
to determine precisely the status of the Jews of England. Neither citizens nor
aliens, many took on the anomalous status of "denizens." But sixteenth-century attitudes about "the racial, national and criminal nature of the Je\vs"
(199) persisted, and in the mid-eighteenth century debate about naturalizing
the Jews Shakespeare's play \vas once again enlisted. Further confirmation of
Shapiro's reading of Shylock comes from some of the allusions to a "knifewielding, circumcising, castrating Shylock" of this period (219).
In teaching The Merchant of Venice one is often faced with overly-reductive
undergraduate interpretations based on a series of binary oppositions: Christian and Jew, usurer and generous friend, Belmont and Venice. Shapiro's
study suggests that an over-arching question of sameness and difference,
both for Shakespeare's play and for many of the Bard's contemporaries, was
that behveen Englishness and Jewishness. This contrast raised in its most
acute form the question of what, precisely, constituted a national identity. As
a study of culhlral formation Shapiro's enlightening book thus expands our
familiarity with the thought patterns and gives us increased access to the
central questions \vhich troubled early modern Englishmen, not least of all
Shakespeare.

Loyola University-Chicago

Suzanne Gossett

Clilllale alld Literature'; Reflections of Environmel1t edited by Janet Perez <1nd
\Vendell Aycock. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, ]995. Pp. 144.
$30.00.
On the day I read this book the temperature where J live plummeted to 26
degrees below zero-not a record low but near it, and a st8.rk contrast with
the ]03 degrees reached seven months earlier in July 1995. For the record,
the <1\'erage surface temper<1ture of the earth in 1995 was 59.7, the highest
registered since tr8.cking began in ]866, with the following years running
do,c behind: 1990, 1991, 1988, 1981, 1987, 1983, 1980, ond 1989. A, e\'en'body knO\\·s ,,·ho reads ne\\"sPJpers or watches tele\·ision, the glob,d \,·<1rl11ing of the IJst decade h<1s recast sl11all t<1lk about the \\"cJther into an
unfolding apncalyptic dral11<J, In the (,Jrl~· da~·s nf Jllctcnrolog~· 5cil'ntist5-=- (011(ei\"t.~d "cliIllJte" as <l more or less stClble regiml" which they could rl'prl'~l'nl
b~· ,l\·cragcs, while "wcather" rcfL'ITCd In tlllctllJting ((1Jlditinns. The
plw!" C'lr~· S. Elbm,· rcminds us, in JIl
here \~n "The Endk'ss
pI
DL'alh and Dl'5tlbtil)J1 in CJrcia \\;lrqul'z's
Stnril''','· th,l! "climatL' rL'll'r . .
\ll the c(lnditill!l5 thJt \,·,luld Il(lrm'lll~· be l'\.pl'cll'd tll nCCllr ,1\ ~(l!lll' 111(,lti(l1l

278

Criticism, Vol. XXXIX, no. 2: Book Reviews

during a specific time of year" (80). What he neglects to mention is that climatic conditions have changed drastically in the three million years or so
during which people have inhabited the earth, and that after millennia of
either disregarding or depending on it, climate is no longer available as a
symbol of predictability, eternal recurrence or even normal expectation.
Climate and Literature appears at a time when literary critics have begun to
apply the insights of environmentalism and cultural geography to the analysis of literary texts, and when cultural studies has turned its attention to the
possibility of a green cultural criticism. Not without flaws, the collection
nevertheless deserves the attention of a wide audience. At their least interesting the essays tend simply to observe the weather, which in Latin America, we are told more than once, can get awfully hot and rainy. At their best,
the essays suggest an exciting new direction for an entire field of interdisciplinary work, and the importance of comparative and ecological approaches
to it.
Bob Dylan famously observed that "You don't need a weatherman to
know which way the wind blows." Yet specialized fields such as glaciology,
dendrochronology, paleoclimatology have profoundly transformed our daily
experience of the weather. 'While science shapes our understanding of climatic processes as they extend through space and time, computer modeling
and satellite technologies, developed for studying the weather, have infiltrated other cultural realms. The study of chaos emerged in the 1960s with
attempts to simulate weather patterns, and it was a meteorologist, Edward
Lorenz of MIT, who introduced the idea of the "butterfly effect" in complex
systems to explain how small differences in input become magnified as output (a theory widely disseminated through popular culture and films such
as Jurassic Park).
This collection brings together thirteen essays that study the cultural impact of climate, focusing on "ancient and modern literary reflections of climates real and imagined" (2). The scope is broadly historical and the texts
under analysis range from classical poetry to modern fiction and poetry in
English, French, and Spanish. Climatological thought has a long history and
the editors have wisely avoided locating the problematic in a single national
context. In the opening essay Rosemary Nielsen and Robert Solomon carefully attend to water imagery in Horace's "Parade Odes," and connect fluctuations in water-states to lithe possibility, especially during imperial
consolidation, of renewed chaos on social, politicat religious, and sexual
scales" (10). Contrasting Horace's outlook, witl, its "rage for order" and fear
of disintegration, to twentieth-century fractal geometry and chaos theory
(which takes a considerably more benign view of turbulence), they study
chaos as an evolving metaphor in the representation of nature. Another essay, by Stephen Newmeyer, takes up the writings of the medieval Jewish
philosopher and poet Jehuda Halevi, who appropriated Greek climatological
theories to promote a return to the Holy Land. v\That emerges from Newmeyer's faSCinating account is an early expression of climatological determinism: Halevi considered the climate of Palestine especially salutary,
making it the ideal site for the reestablishment of the Jewish people. Halevi's
major philosophical work, the Kuzari, argues, in terms parallel to the case
made by Greek and Roman writers for the superiority of their climates and
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national cultures, that geography conditions identity: "There are places in
which particular plants, metals, or animals are found, or where the inhabitants are distinguished by their form and character, since perfection or deficiency of the soul are produced by the mingling of elements" (23-24). From
here it was a short logical leap to his assertion, which echoes a passage from
the Talmud, that "the atmosphere of the Holy Land makes [one] wise" (24)
-a theory that explains something of the intense longing that has characterized Jewish life in the diaspora.
The relation of cultural identity to a national space also comes up in Jack
Jordan's essay on "Climate and Identity in the Literature of the French Antilles." Jordan divides the francophone literatures of the Caribbean into three
periods. In the first, current between the 1840s and the 1930s, writers cast
Martinique and Guadeloupe in the soft tropical glow we now associate with
Club Med brochures. During the second period, and under the influence of
the negritude movement, which grounded black cultural identity in African
language and customs, the poet Airne Cesaire looked to Africa rather than to
his native Martinique for an aesthetic and sense of identity. Later in his career, however, Cesaire figured the Antillian landscape as a map of authenticity and identification. In a 1977 interview he described himself as "un
hornme de terre, de montagne et de feu/' and continued: "In my sensibility
the mountain [Mont Pelee] plays a very great role because I am a Martinican, and because at the horizon of the Martinican sensibility there is always
the presence of the mountain" (1l8). Jordan shows how writers of a third, or
"creole," period in the literature of the French Antilles rejected essentialism
and embraced a regionalism that moved them "from looking for identity in
an abstract, unifying universal to rooting it in a cross-cultural poetics, itself
inseparable from the climate and landscape unique to the islands" (119).
The relation of climatological influence to the construction of national
identity is explored in several other essays. Wendell McClendon's "Zola's
Uses of Climate in The Land" isolates passages describing the physical environment in La Terre to make a compelling argument about the practice of literary naturalism. As McClendon shows, Zola's novel systematically mingles
human and non-human nature: its unrelenting emphasis on the elements
imputes a powerful agency to weather, and its portrayal of fictional characters turns subjectivity itself into a sort of climatic effect. La Terre, McClendon
contends, induces in its readers a feeling of powerlessness, as if they were
"witness to an immense and unjust natural disaster, non-human on the surface but in which human beings are clearly implicated" (51). In the world of
the novel, natural "law," figured as a massive and mechanical cyclicality,
forces puny human actors into compliance. The contributors to Climate and
Literature sometimes slip into such a mode of thinking themselves. McClendon's contribution demonstrates both the strengths and limitations of
this approach, its capacity to transform particular discursive features into
something subtle and deserving of careful analysis, alongside a tendency to
mystify the natural as an autonomous and eternal order. Raquel Romeu, for
example, in an essay on the influence of climate in the fiction of Alejo Carpentier and Mario Vargas Llosa, argues that "the diversity of climates in
Peru and other South American countries generally has resulted in a plurality of cultures, producing serious economic, political and even moral prob-
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lems" (110). Without denying the importance of climate to food production
and to resource and health-care issues, we need to read these factors in conjunction with the political and teclmological problems at the root of social injustice, rather than positing a direct monocausal relationship between
weather and regional development.
The sole essay among the thirteen that turns directly to ecology for insight
is one of the best, and concludes the volume: Luis A. Jimenez's "Afro-Cuban
Culture, Ecology, and Climate in 'La comparsa' by Felipe Pichardo Moya."
Jimenez draws on Eugene P. Odum's concept of the "biotic community" to
read "La cornparsa," a 1916 poem about carnival celebration. Jimenez cites
Odum's textbook Fundamentals of Ecology, which played a major part in revolutionizing ecology in the 1950s and 1960s by foregrounding the concept of
the "ecosystem." Odum's style of systems ecology is basically holistic, taking
community organization as a basic structural unit, in contrast with a reductionist approach that explains wholes by reference to constituent parts. The
value of such concepts to both social ecologists and ecocentrics" -so-called
red-greens and green-greens-is considerable. Jimenez's dual purpose in this
essay is to demonstrate the origin of Afro-Cuban customs in African tradition, and to "illustrate how the collective feelings of the group are molded to
a climatic and ecological unity" (129). Jimenez's essay succeeds admirably at
the first task, but his discovery of climatic conditions "reflected" in the music, dance, and cultural practices of the Afro-Cuban community finally seems
less satisfying. 111e essay deftly reiterates the premise of the entire collection,
that climate is a given we can find mirrored in literary texts. Yet any direct
correlation of regional and national cultures with biomes tends to occlude
the non-climatic variables (political, ideological, and economic) that mediate
our experience of nature.
What all of the essays reveal is that interaction between social and environmental factors, culture and climate, remains so tightly imbricated that we
cannot separate one from the other. Ever since the French naturalist Buffon
attacked American climate and moral capacity (and Thomas Jefferson rose to
their defence), there have been attempts to link climate with culli,ral difference. The nineteenth-century promoter of Western expansion, William Gilpin, hypothesized the existence of an "isothermal belt" where higher cultures
thrived, which followed a westward trajectory from Athens and Rome to
Topeka and Denver. At the turn of the century the Yale geographer Ellsworth Huntington theorized differences alTIOng human races by reference to
climatic factors, plotting on maps and graphs indices such as health, longevity, industrial output, and level of "civilization." In Huntington's racialized
hierarchy, Britain and the Atlantic seaboard scored a perfect 100, while countries situated in the tropics ranked very low. New paradigms for studying
the relation of climate to culture will avoid such transparent absurdities, but
will still need to come to terms with the realization that climate is both anthropogenic and subject to severe overall variability. This collection reminds
us that climate has a history, which can be read in novels and poetry as well
as in landscape or statistical records. It opens vistas on an important topic
just as our ideas about it are undergoing a revolution.
If

University of Iowa

Alvin Snider
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Disturbing Pleasllres: Lenrning Popular ClIlture by Henry A. Giroux. New York
Routledge, 1994. Pp. xi + 202. $52.50 cloth; $16.95 paper.
Making Malcolm: The Myth & Meaning of Malcolm X by Michael Eric Dyson.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. xxi + 215. $19.95· cloth; $10.95
paper.
A great deal gets written, and said, these days about the "public intellectual," and whether or not such a thing, or person, can still meaningfully exist, with the frequently stated corollary that if the times were better, so too
would be the people who serve them. But is this really true, or is the whole
so-called argument just another-perhaps more palatable-way of saying
that "we" who make such claims don't like the intellectuals we've got, so
rather than dignifying their presence wi th reasoned response, we'd prefer
simply to define them out of existence? In other words, for the sake of a certain homebound comfort we would prefer not to do the intellectual work
that comes too visibly to hand, so a pose of nostalgic know-nothingism (perhaps no pose at all) is more expedient.
In his new collection of essays, Henry Giroux returns to Adorno's injunction that "it is part of morality not to be at home in one's home" (147), and
then offers a useful critique of the unawareness-regardless of how intentional-that informs much posturing about the question of intellectual work,
and the institutional encounter with the "Other," which is the greatest public
challenge now confronting America's academic middle class. Giroux's proximate text, in his discussion of intellectual homes, is the work of Paulo Freire,
specifically Freire's pedagogy of "critical literacy" (141). Giroux differentiates
between the locatedness of Gramsci's "organic intellectual" and the
"homelessness" of Freire as a "border intellectual":

Of course, this is not meant to suggest that intellectuals have to go into
exile to take up Freire's work, but it does suggest that in becoming
border crossers, it is not uncommon for many of them to engage his
work as an act of bad faith. Refusing to negotiate or deconstruct the
borders that define their own politics of location .... [and] From the
comforting perspective of the colonizing gaze, such theorists often appropriate Freire's work without engaging its historical specificity and
ongoing political project. (148)
This failure of engagement-or rather the argument against it-is key, and
key to the concerns that animate not only the current volume, but Giroux's
whole career: as scholar, teacher, public figure.
Henry A. Giroux is the Waterbury Chair Professor in Secondary Education
at Pennsylvania State University; he is the author of numerous books and articles, and is well known as a public and impassioned presenter of his work.
Disturbing Pleasures collects (in revision) pieces that first appeared in such
journals as Cultural Studies, College Literature, The Review of Education, and
Cultural Crtique. There are nine essays in a11 (one of which is co-authored
with Roger l. Simon); each makes good on the subtitle, "learning popular
culture." That is what Giroux is doing here: learning the popular culture
that, after Adorno, is the "home" we must work critically not to be at home
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in; the home that Americans make for themselves with results that redound
upon the rest of the world. The topics range from fashion advertising to Walt
Disney, photography to the privatization of public education, academic cultural studies to Paulo Freire. The discussion of Freire is particularly valuable, not only as a meditation on the possibilities of the "border intellectual,"
but as a cautionary reminder of how not to appropriate Freire's frequently
over-popularized work. In other discussions-of Benetton advertising, or
popular films (Good Morning, Vietnam; Pretty Woman; Grand Canyon)-Giroux
shows himself an able reader, and teacher, of popular culture; it is here most
vividly that he makes his case for a "pedagogy of representation" (89), and
the responsibility intellectuals bear-particularly ones who are publicly
funded-to undertake it:

The challenge of a new cultural politics, one that takes popular and
media culture seriously, is as much a pedagogical challenge as it is a
political one. The issue for cultural workers is not merely to recognize
the importance of cultural texts such as Good Morning, Vietnam and
Pretty Woman in shaping social identities, but to address how representations are constructed and taken up through social memories that are
taught, learned, mediated, and appropriated within particular institutional and discursive formations of power. (45)
Evident here, as throughout the book, is Giroux's commitment-for him as
passionate as it is necessary-to the crucial relation between institutional
work and public life: the one impossible in any meaningful sense without
the other.
This commitment has led him more than once into conflicts, from which
he has never shrunk; and it leads him here, inevitably, into a consideration
of "cultural studies," which is the stage on which a great deal of academic
politics and presumption get publicly acted out. "I want to ... argue," Giroux writes,

that cultural studies is still too rigidly tied to the modernist academic
disciplinary structures that it often criticizes.. . What it fails to do is
to critically address a major prop of disciplinarity, which is the notion
of pedagogy as a transparent vehicle for transmitting truth and knowledge.
. The haunting question here is, what is it about pedagogy
that allows cultural studies theorists to ignore it? One answer may lie
in the refusal of cultural studies theorists to either take schooling seriously as a site of struggle or to probe how traditional pedagogy produces particular identities, how it constructs students through a range
of social forms. (130)
To his credit, Henry Giroux has never shied away from such concerns; he
would doubtless accept as honorable the designation of his project-like the
focus of his career generally-as "pedagogical." And for those who have
used that term to dismiss his work as mere pedagogy the present essays are
sufficient to discredit such condescension, particularly among people who
ought to know better, much better.
Like Giroux, Michael Eric Dyson is a scholar who has been subjected to
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criticism not so much because of the work he has done, which is admirable,
but because of the label that has been attached to it, and him-through no
particular wish of his own. Dyson is frequently grouped, these days, with a
number of other African American academics who are taken to representwhether for or against-the last best hope of public intellectual life in the
United States. (The example of Giroux alone is sufficient to challenge the authority and exclusivity of such claims, but facts often have little meaning in
the domain of publicity, where labels take the place of reasoned inquiry, and
where prejudice too easily supplants truth.) Fortunately for us, Professor Dyson-like Professor Giroux-is quite capable of making his own case, if
given the chance.
That is precisely what he does in his second book, Making Malcolm, no less
so than in his first one, Reflecting Black: African-American Cultural Criticism
(University of Minnesota, 1993), which is a collection of essays and call-andresponse-like "Improvisations." (Professor Dyson is also an ordained Baptist
minister, as well as adept at rap lyrics; his writing is lively, diverse,
"engaged" as Henry Giroux might say.) The topics of the first book are various, ranging from Michael Jackson to Toni Morrison, political correctness to
gospel music, and including discussions of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X; the latter becomes the sole subject of Dyson'S second book. Makillg
Malcolm is not in any extended sense a biography, however; nor is it a critical study of the man's "life and works," in the usual sense. Instead, it is the
account of a personal and deeply felt encounter between Dyson and another
African Alnerican whom he never met in life, but whom he comes to know
by working through the various "myths" crated around Malcolm:
As I have matured, journeying from factory worker to professor, it is
the Malcolm who valued truth over habit who has appealed most to
me, his ability to be self-critical and to change his direction an unfailing sign of integrity and courage, But these two Malcolms need not be
in ultimate, fatal conflict, need not be fractured by the choice behveen
seeking an empowering racial identity and linking ourselves to the
truth no matter what it looks like, regardless of color, class, gender,
sex, or age. They are both legitimate guests, and Malcolm's career and
memory are enabling agents for both pursuits, His complexity is our
gift (17)
As this passage suggests, the book is not only about Dyson's personal
"meeting" with Malcolm; it is also about what has, and perhaps more urgently, what c01lld occur if a more general, and historically informed, meeting were to take place, inasmuch as Malcolm's "complexity is our gift."
Like Henry Giroux, Michael Dyson comes from il working-class background. Subsequently, both men ha\'c been translated by' the academy and
its culture into an alternate domain of pri\'ilege; the work of each is inscribed knowingly and in\'aluably by that experience of lea\'ing "home," the
one a professor of education occupying an endowed chair, the other a profes501' of comll"lunication studies and Director of the Institute of African-Amcrican RC5carch at the L'ni\'l:r.5it~, of ?\:orth Carolina. "To comprehend the full
s\\'cep of a fisurc's life and thought." D:'son write;;:, "it i5 nccc55ar~; to riZlcc
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that figure's career in its culhlral and historical context and view the trends
and twists of thought that mark significant periods of change and development" (63). This procedure, which Dyson terms "trajectory analysis," is one
he submits himself to-tellingly-no less so than his subject, Malcolm X,
producing a running commentary all. the social construction of subject positions, with respect to class and race and-with special relevance-gender.
The longest section of the book, "X Marks the Plots: A Critical Reading of
Malcolm's Readers," offers a concise and valuable overview of the various
"Malcolms" that readers have constructed, each plotting a different
"trajectory," either more or less informed and self critical, with these trajectories being organized generally according to four headings: " ... Malcolm as
hero and saint, Malcolm as a public moralist, Malcolm as victim and vehicle
of psychohistorical forces, and Malcolm as revolutionary figure judged by
his career trajectory from nationalist to alleged socialist" (24). What follows
this summary discussion are four examjnations of Malcolm in relation to
specific topics: resurgent nationalism and rap; black film; Spike Lee's appropriation of Malcolm (which Dyson largely approves, proposing that "Never
before in American cinema has an alternative black spirituality been so intelligently represented" [139]); and contemporary American politics, especially
with regard to the dangerous predicament of young African American
males. The book concludes with a hopeful, if brief, meditation on "turning
the corner" away frOlTI racial divisiveness and crude stereotyping. Of particular relevance and value-both for its insights and also for its method-is
the discussion of Malcolm's impact on rap music and hip hop culture. Here
Dyson treats popular texts not as many commentators do-particularly those
espousing politically trendy causes-as cultural souvenirs that attest to the
collector's hip authenticity, but as legitimate forms of cultural inquiry, concurrent with his own. "For the past decade," he writes, "rap artists-who as
informal ethnographers of black youth culture translate the inarticulate suffering of poor black masses into articulate anger-have warned of the genocidal consequences of ghetto life for poor blacks" (163). It is a warning we
have ignored at our peril, with the ghettoizing of "popular" culture, which
both Dyson and Giroux work against, abetting an ignorance as dangerous as
it is familiar.
So, what to do? Both authors offer useful and insightful-sometimes inspired-suggestions that might be summed up using a term of the sociologist Richard Sennett, who wrote about the "hidden injuries of class." The
injuries inflicted by class, together with race and gender as these have been
variously constructed, are perhaps not so "hidden" now as they were more
than thirty years ago, when SeIU1ett devised his term. That this is so is surely
to the good, and due in no small measure to the work of authors such as
Dyson and Giroux, who act and write as public intellectuals without troubling lmnecessarily about whether or not they may be operating without a
license. Their commitment and honesty are license enough (although it is
possible to wish that Giroux could write sometimes with more of Dyson's
straightforwardness, and Dyson would occasionally allow himself more of
Giroux's extended scope of argument). Now that the cat is out of the bag
culturally, with respect to the injuries we have done to each other, victims
and victimizers alike, it's anybody's guess whether the academy will be up
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to the public challenge that its own over-eager rhetoric invites, or \vhether
the professors will turn this moment of opportunity into one more internecine squabble the relevance of which remains purely "academic." If the latter
happens, it will be against the strong counter examples offered by Michael
Dyson and Henry Giroux.

lAll7yl1e State University

Jerry Herron

Cultural Selection by Gary Taylor. New York: Basic Books, 1996. Pp. ix + 325.
$26.00.

In fourteen vignettes chosen to represent a day in the life of Shakespeare
for a recent two-page spread in The New York Times Magazine entitled "All
Shakespeare, All the Time," the only scholar named is Gary Taylor. Why
should Gary Taylor be selected as the single academic to receive lnedia recognition in The Tillles? The moment illustrates the thesis of Taylor'S new
book: gaining access to public attention involves a struggle for control of the
mechanisms that regulate cultural selection. Taylor's inclusion implies others' exclusion.
In 1961 the British leftist Raymond Williams spoke the phrase that
launched a thousand canon revisions. Thirty-five years later the echo of vVilIiams' concept "selective tradition" can be heard in Taylor'S title Cu!tural
Selection. But Taylor's assessment of the left's performance in our current culture wars is blunt. The left, he says, "lost the culture wars of the 1980s." A
chief reason for defeat is the left's unwillingness and inabiHty to engage the
popular media, the point of entry into widescale public discourse and debate. Lack of engagement means that the left selects itself out of the competition before the battle begins, thereby giving up in advance. Taylor'S
involvement with the media is thus part of his point. His drive to cross the
threshold into the public arena is directly linked to his desire to remedy the
left's failure.
Some readers will dismiss Taylor's harsh indichnent of the left as exaggerated. But legitimate qualifications to his argument should not distract from
the basic accuracy of his charge. Here is a decided imbalance in the respective impacts of right and left in the public debate about culture. Comparatively speaking, vVilliam Bennett, Allan Bloom, Lym1e Cheney, Dinesh
d'Souza are household names. No equivalent roll call is possible on the left
side. Gerald Graff's \\'ork has led to the formation of Teachers for a Democratic Culture, but the organization'S ne\\'sletter, while important, remains so
obscure that it does not register on the scale of public attention. The content
of John Guillory'S CIIlfllrn! Capital concerns class inequality in the distribution of cultural pri\'ilcge, but his style displays no desire to reach a wider
audience.
As the examples of VVilliam Bennett and L~'nne Cheney indicate, the
power of the cultural right deriycs from its connection to Republican part~'
politics. Again there is a \·acuum on the other side. The most prominent instance of authentic affiliation \\·jth the Democratic part~' illustrates the di-
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lemma. Arthur Schlesinger's Disuniting of America can provide no effective
opposition because on cultural issues he is, according to Taylor's approriate
label, "conservative."
If Gary Taylor has identified a major problem on the left side of the culture wars, then how successful is his proposed alternative? Taylor's solution,
which focuses on access to major mass media, needs to be assessed on tvvo
levels. First, on a practical level, Taylor manifestly succeeds in breaking into
the select circle of voices and ideas circulated by The New York Times, which
reviewed Cultural Selection in both the daily and Sunday review spaces.
A short review of Taylor's career suggests how remarkable this breakthrough is, for his early reputation was made in the hitherto little-known
field of textual editing. The stature of his work with Stanley Wells on the
Oxford edition of Shakespeare is attested by its adoption as the text for the
new Norton Shakespeare under the direction of Stephen Greenblatt. Taylor
also co-edited with Michael Warren a collection on multiple texts of King
Lear that initiated a major trend in rethinking principles of editing. But the
specific cause of Taylor's emergence into public notoriety was the announcement of his discovery of a new Shakespeare poem. Plucked out of Kansas
like Dorothy in the Wizard of Oz, Taylor landed on the front page of The New
York Times, complete with photograph and "Man in the News" profile, on
November 24, 1985.
While this limelight treatment cannot have been entirely unwelcome, the
sudden exposure must also have been a painful shock because of the controversy it ignited over the authenticity of Taylor's attribution of the poem to
Shakespeare. Taylor learned the hard way about the media's power and this
experience marks the decisive turning point in the development of his career.

Showing admirable resilience and resourcefulness, Taylor used his unexpected celebrity to reinvent himself and to launch a new career as a public
intellectual as the author of Reinventing Shakespeare. This popularly written,
accessible book is the best comprehensive account of the revolutionary
changes in Shakespeare criticism and is far superior to the main conservative
rival, Brian Vickers' Appropriating Shakespeare. Ironically, Taylor's triumph
here proves that the left has not lost the culture wars across the board on
every front, contrary to his sweeping claims in his latest book.
Cultural Selection represents Taylor's continued bid to establish himself as
a public intellectual. The new book's greatly expanded historical, geographical and disciplinary scope raises the ante conSiderably. Amidst the wideranging commentary, Taylor returns frequently enough to his homebase to
make one feel that he is writing a vast metaphysics of textual editorship
when he eloquently delineates the contingencies and fragility surrounding
cultural artefacts. Yet the all-out effort necessary for the difficult feat of carving out a public niche has left Taylor with insufficient time to reflect on the
possible complexities, problems and limitations of the role of public intellectual.
Despite Taylor's style of explanatory decisiveness-his declarative oneliners hum with pith and zip-there is something curiously fragmented, tentative and incomplete about the overall argument. A case in point is the final
chapter on Richard Nixon. The focus on Nixon is a logical extension of the
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theme of the culture wars. Taylor sees Nixon's appeal to traditional values
as the culture wars' starting-point; Nixon's victory inaugurates the right's
dominance of the Presidency, the downfall and paralysis of the left. Taylor
twice remarks on how the assassination of Kennedy, when Taylor was 10
years old, made it possible to reverse the result of the 1960 election. Moreover, the chapter can also be read as Taylor's intervention in the 1996 presidential election. We are left in no doubt how Taylor feels about Bob Dole's
identification with Nixon. But Bill Clinton is present only in an epigraph.
Taylor's silence on Clinton prevents him from addressing the problems on
cultural policy within the Democratic party and he thus cuts himself off
from a full consideration of conflicts on the left side of the spectrum.
A second difficulty is that Taylor'S hyperbole about the left's failure causes
him to ignore the very large exception of Henry Louis Gates, Jr. Much recent
discussion of public intellectuals has emphasized black critics, with Gates
justifiably seen as the leading figure. Gates's media savvy is part of his conceptual brilliance; his mastery of public presentation makes possible a substantive contribution to national public-policy debates, while his deftness
makes it unlikely that Gates will be caught in Michael Lerner's unproductive, predictable bid with the Clintons over the politics of meaning. The absence of Gates in Cultural Selection is felt not only because he is a relevant
model for the public intellectual stance to which Taylor aspires but also because of the topic of race. Throughout Cultural Selection, Taylor alludes tantalizingly but tangentially to racial matters, yet the issue of race never quite
comes into focus. In one key instance, the issue is disturbingly thwarted
when Taylor transforms Ellison's Invisible Man into a metaphor for the invisibility of the editor, thus effacing and circumventing the specific racial significance of Ellison's work. This is not to deny the validity of interracial
communication that permits Ellison to speak for Taylor, and Taylor for Ellison, but rather to insist that the complicated medium of "lower frequencies"
that enables such exchanges is not a system of perfect equivalencies in which
one element can simply substitute for another, without explanation or analysis.
Gary Taylor has unquestionably succeeded in creating an opening-his
own evolutionary niche-in the public sphere but Cultural Selection does not
fully clarify how he will use the opportunity this consolidation of his celebrity affords him. The answer will not be provided by Taylor's current project
as editor of the Oxford edition of Thomas Middleton. A full answer to the
question of the direction toward which Cultural Selection is pointing must
await its sequel.
Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute

Peter Erickson

Literary Realism and the Ekphrastic Tradition by Mack Smith. University Park:
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995. Pp. 269. $35.00.

The question of the nature and even the possibility of representation has
dominated twentieth-century philosophy and literary theory. In painting and
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the plastic arts, representation was abandoned early in favor of abstraction,
which in turn has been called into question. But the novel, because its medium is language, could not as completely divorce itself from representation,
although in the hands of authors such as Joyce, Beckett, Pynchon, and DeLillo it has certainly problematized the relationship between word and
world. Nonetheless, as Mack Smith says, "a shift in realist paradigms has
taken place in this century from an empirical, correspondence theory of signification to a foundational model emphasizing discourse and a coherence
theory of meaning" (2). Coherence theory holds that meaning is generated
by the internal order of a semiotic system, regardless of whether that system
represents or corresponds to an external reality. Rival systems can be coherent while offering opposing or radically differing claims, as with the Ptolemaic and Copernican cosmologies.
The coherence model may not be the recent paradigm shift that Smith
claims it is, at least within literary theory. Some would say it is present in
Aristotle's "Poetics," particularly in his distancing of artistic probablity from
actual possibility, that it is found in Sir Philip Sidney'S insistence that poetry
delivers a "golden" world, not "brazen" reality, and that the battle against
correspondence escalates in Oscar Wilde's overt celebration of poetic untruth. And to the extent that the trashing of correspondence models is a
tvventieth-century phenomenon, one should say more than Smith does about
its appearance in the early Formalists. But, in Smith's defence, he is not writing the history of a critical idea, he is offering a reading of various novels:
Don Quixote, Emma, Anna Karenina, Ulysses, and Gravity's Rainbow.
Smith argues that each of these novels concerns itself with the correspondence-coherence opposition. Each novel embodies by way of textual ekphrasis-descriptive passages that refer to the issue of representation-the
problems involved in the common notion that language can represent a
realm of truth and facticity. But here a difficulty arises. Smith has claimed
that the shift to a coherence paradigm is a tvventieth-century phenomenon,
but half of his book is devoted to finding the correspondence paradigm critiqued in novels that pre-date our century. He does not explain the paradox,
although what he seems to mean is that the theoretical articulation of coherence theory is a tvventieth-century phenomenon, but that novelists of the
past anticipated it, just as many authors can be said to anticipate Freudian
insights. In any case, Smith wants it both ways-coherence theory was discovered by twentieth- century philosophy, but Cervantes, Austen, and Tolstoy knew all about it.
'What links these three to Joyce and Pynchon, in Smith's view, is a common (poststructural and postrnodern) suspicion that social codes, language
and "discourse" fail to penetrate or reveal the real and in fact often merely
delude. One's judgment of Smith's book will depend in part on how carefully nuanced his readings of each novel seem to be. Personally, I did not
feel greatly enlightened by his discussion of Don Quixote, which does not adequately move beyond the truism that Cervantes exposes the absurdity of
Quixote's discourse on the real. Quixote's words do not correspond to reality
-there is no news here.
The ekphrastic moments in Emma include Emma's drawing of Harriet and
the word game that Emma and Elton call "charade." Smith's analysis of
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these textual moments leads to commentary on Emma's mistaken representation of her social reality. That Emma holds some kinship with Quixote in
this regard is, again, not a new critical insight. Smith is employing a new
critical vocabulary to describe what used to be called the appearance VS.
reality theme. More interesting is Smith's assertion that Austen's text presents, as an alternative to Emma's representation of the feat a sort of intuitionism that anticipates Tolstoy. "The text disguises the source of social truth
by presenting it more as a priori intuitive realization than as an external
code" (106),
The discussion of Anna Karenina moves nicely from an examination of ekphrastic moments, such as the descriptions of the paintings of Vronsky and
Mihailov, to a discussion of Tolstoy'S suspicion of social codes and discourses, which (predictably at this point in Smith's study) only delude in their
pretenses to correspondence. Smith contrasts Tolstoy'S critique of these codes
with his representation, primarily through Levin, of a nonlinguistic apprehension of truth. "Tolstoy'S text ... seeks a more keen discursive correspondence to actuality by exposing
the faults of a coherence view
emphasizing the linguistic structure of reality. The valorized correspondent
discourse is one that would, if possible, dispense with language entirely"
(138), Tolstoy is in the melancholy position of needing correspondence while
recognizing that social codes merely cohere. Despite the fact that each novel
seems to lead us to the same conclusion, that correspondence is an ever-receding ideal, Smith has found, by way of ekphrastic moments and the correspondence-coherence opposition, a fresh way of approaching the problem of
Tolstoy'S cynicism and intuitionism, which ultimately led to his rejection of
his own fiction. Seemingly, Tolstoy came to recognize the contradiction between his skepticism concerning language and his actions as novelist.
At this point, it may sOlllld as though the word "realism" in Smith's title is
inappropriate, but Smith's position is that "realism is more than just a mode
by which novels claim fidelity to actuality, It is a tradition in which novelists
examine dramatically and narratively the central focus of philosophic realism, the relation of word to world" (157). This definition seems to allow realism to include its opposite or other-any fiction that can be read as a critique
of realism. Some readers may see carelessness here, others will see something fashionably deconstructive.
If twentieth-century philosophy has invested heavily in the coherence paradigm, and Smith mentions a number of philosophers briefly at the start of
his chapters on Joyce and Pynchon, one would expect the paradigm to
emerge even more clearly in our century's fiction. In Ulysses, correspondence
is denied by means of the multiple narrative styles by which "Joyce questiems the possibility of objective knowledge separate from our modes of
discourse" (161). Like Anna Karenina, Ulysses betrays a desire for correspondence, found most persistently in the later novel's musical motifs. In a long
argument, Smith attempts to show that "the entire musical ekphrasis, extending and resonating throughout the text, is a semiotic system that constrains the indeterminacy of textual meaning by making the multiple
intertextual signifiers refer ultimately to a signified representing consubstantiality and thus at least the comforting illusion of correspondence" (176), I
leave it to others to decide whether the musical ekphrasis really aCCOll-
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plishes this wistful resurrection of the older paradigm that Joyce otherwise
refutes.
Because Smith has defined, not uncontroversially, the tradition of realism
as a tradition that critiques its own possibility, Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow
is realism's crowning achievement. But realism has become its own opposite
when Smith says that this novel reveals "postmodern language as an imprisoning system of internal coherence that has replaced an idealized correspondence with reality/' although, yet again, Gravity's Rainbow reveals "a
nostalgic longing for this relation" (202). In this novel, Smith's theme can be
coaxed from an examination of ekphrastic descriptions of songs, myths, and
artifacts, although the principal ekphrasis is the recurrent allusion to cinema,
the frames of which "connote better than any other form the 'framing' of
reality" that semiotic systems are guilty of when one no longer believes that
they can represent reality objectively (215).
Did each of these authors really entertain such similarly skeptical and
cOinCidentally postmodern attitudes toward language and especially toward
intuition? Or is the signifier so inevitably free-floating as to take on whatever
illusion of rrteaning each generation of interpreters wishes to impose upon it?
Is Smith's book an example of the critic finding, in Norman Holland's term,
his own "identity theme" in the literature under study? I am inclined to opt
for the latter explanation. Smith's critical persona or identity is entirely postmodern, and there is a note of triumph in each of his demonstrations that
one of the great authors of the past was a closet postmodern, as though we
had witnessed the "outing" of Cervantes and Jane Austen.
Smith's study, then, raises a question: why is postmodemism so pleased to
preside over the demise of reason and representation? And why, even as it
privileges coherence theory over correspondence, does it so glibly rehearse
formulas that lack coherence, such as the assertion that intuition can replace
logic, which is merely a tool of oppression? In this postmodern turn from
reason, science has often become the target, and Smith includes the required
paragraph denying the objectivity of scientific knowledge, seeing "the history of science as the succession of conceptual schemes that create moreworkable concepts of nature through which practical scientific and
epistemological advances may be achieved-the conceptual scheme is measured not only by the adequacy of its approximations to nature but by the
theoretical and technological answers that can be formulated by the kind and
quality of questions it allows" (158). Although this is meant to convey a
view of scientific discourse as something other than a correspondent discourse, the only phrase in Smith's sentence that makes sense (again, Smith
would have it both ways) is the phrase that allows "approximations to nature." And how, indeed, could science be "workable" if this were not the
case?
If it were merely a matter of specialists arguing among themselves about
novels, the privileging of theories of knowledge that rob us of places from
which to make judgments and know the truth could seem relatively innocent. But Smith's celebration of intuition and of the denial that our words
can mean anything in particular is a symptom of a larger assault on reason
in the humanities, an assault found, for instance, in the claims of some feminists that mathematics is merely a male discourse, or found in the claims of
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some Afro-centrists that ancient Egyptians had flying machines and knew
about quantum mechanics. If taken seriously by our students, such irrationalism could have disastrous consequences, and we should object to it even
when it limits itself to seeing its own reflection in a handful of novels.
Loyola University, New Orleans

Bruce Henricksen

__Gur Vampires, Ourselves by Nina Auerbach. Chicago and London: University
of Chicago Press, 1995. Pp. 238. $22.00.

Nina Auerbach's latest book blends literary analysis of vampire texts with
a cultural reading of how vampirism infects our thoughts. Our Vampires,
Ourselves offers a critical, and largely chronological, survey of vampire stories, beginning with a comparison of Byron's 1816 fragmentary tale introducing the vampire figure and Polidori's The Vampyre (1819) and ending with
Kathryn Bigelow's 1987 film Near Dark. Yet it would be a mistake to view
OUf Vampires, Ourselves as being only a history of vampires in literature, for
it is at the same time "a history of Anglo-American culture through its mutating vampires" (1). This book is a fascinating and appealing historical
study that is also a model of engaging cultural criticism.
Auerbach posits "that v<:t.mpirism springs not only from ~.,!noi~, xenophobia, or immortal rangings, but from generosity and shared enthuSiasm":
her own excitement concerning the-subject motivates her argument (vii). The
four textual chapters of Our Vampires, Ourselves are arranged according to a
loose historical and typological chronology and focus on developing cultural
paradigms of the vampire. There is a brief and personalized introduction
that sets out the cultural issues to be analyzed, followed by the first chapter,
which c?~~iders Romanti~~~.2.I}Y~_~tiq~s regarding marriage and frie:ndship in
relation to yai"ibus 'hineteenth- and twentieth.:.century fictional, theatrical, and
film-texts -figuring the vampire as an intimate. 'The seCoTIaChapter 'pivots'
arouna a" discussion--of-Bram-Sroker'-s-Dfcicullt-comparing that work to F. W.
Mumau's Nosferatu as a version of the animalistic Dracula. In her third chapter, Auerbach traces the various transmutations of psychic vampirism in fiction contemporary with and following Stoker's novel, including work by
Stephen King and Anne Rice, and popular films, ranging from Todd Browning's, starring Bela Lugosi, to the Hammer films with Christopher Lee and
Peter Cushing. The fourth chapter ambitiously charts out how the promise
embodied in 1970s vampires gives way to the "depressed creatures" of the
Reagan years (165). By examining how contemporary vampires are represented as typically dysfunctional, Auerbach convincingly demonstrates how
horror stories reproduce and refract cultural tensions.
Auerbach's first chapter lays the groundwork for her argument by delineating the relationship between Byron and Polidori and analyzing the male
friendships depicted in their relevant works as vampirism of the homoerotic
kind. She goes on to describe the less-known theatrical adaptation of Polidori's story by l R. Planche and considers how the technology of the ghost
trap, "q pair of spring-controlled doors cut into the scenery," encouraged

292

Criticism, Vol. XXXIX, no. 2: Book Reviews

audiences to perceive vampires as disembodied spirits (23). Another significant innovation introduced by Planche concerns his emphasis on the vampire's dependence on and association with the moon. Noting how cinematic
treatments of monsters (vampires, wolfmen) make much of the moon, Auerbach contrasts the Shakespearean vision of the moon as it "licenses enchanted eroticism" (A Midsummer Night's Dream) with the mid-Victorian idea
that the "moon is the magic fusion among species, the balm that joins human to preterhuman, death to life" (25-26). Auerbach then shifts her discussion to the popular serial Varney the Vampire, whose author is presumed to
be James Malcolm Rymer. Many of Varney's characteristics (that he is preternatural yet bound by human relationships, that he can transform victims
into his own kind, that he is "an increasingly representative interloper in a
predatory society") also surface in Stoker's novel and other versions of Dracula (29). Auerbach takes care to demonstrate Varney's similarities to other
social predators in literature, such as Thackeray's Becky Sharp (of Vanity
Fair) and Sweeney Todd (of George Dibdin Pitt's The String of Pearls; or, The
Fiend of Fleet Street and the Stephen Sondheim and Hugh Wheeler 1979
Broadway musical), as well as Alan Raby, the title character of Dion Boucicaull's drama, The Vampire (1852).
Turning fron1 male relationships and identity formation, Auerbach concludes her first chapter by exploring the connections among Sheridan Le
Fanu's Carmilla (1872), Coleridge's Christa bel, and film adaptations of the story, notably The Hunger (1983: directed by Tony Scott and based on Whitley
Strieber's novel). She carefully documents the transformation of the female
vampiric relationship from fiction to film in claiming that "Carmilla is one of
the few self-accepting homosexuals in Victorian or any literature" and that
"homosexuality itself is figured as female" (41). Auerbach describes Carmilla's erotic aUaclunent to Laura as Le Fanu represents it and contrasts this
female model of vampirism with the male examples previously discussed,
noting of Carmilla that as a woman, the vampiric friend releases a boundless capacity for intimacy" (45). Carmilla's "vampirism ... is an interchange,
a sharing, an identification, that breaks down the boundaries of familial roles
and the sanctioned hierarchy of marriage" (47). In contrast, tvventieth-cenhlry cinematic treatments of female vampirism "repudiate the lintimacy, or
friendship' of their sentimental predecessors" (60).
Bram Stoker's Dracula continues the journey frOlTI intimacy to self-consciousness by insisting on his right of possession according to the hierarchy
depicted in the novel, as the words "belongs to me" resonate (71). As Auerbach remarks, Dracula is "harbinger of a world to come, a world that is our
own" (63). As one who "identifies only with a vanished conquering race
whose token is not a mortal but an animal/' Dracula "reshapes" himself
lIinto his unrecognizable likeness/' more like Keats' Lamia than Coleridge's
Geraldine (64). Auerbach gracefully demonsh'ates the transformations of Stoker's Dracula in various film treahnents of the Dracula subject, noting that
"Murnau's Nosferatu and Browning's Dracula struggle to reunite the vampire
to his mortal friend .... Both movies finally succumb to the coldness at the
heart of Stoker's novel, the requiem of a tradition of intimacy" (78). Dracula
is an isolated figure, who is unable to bond in the way of other male characters in the novel; he does not appear to infect other men with his vampirism
II
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but makes pawns of infected women. Auerbach connects this vampire figure
to Oscar Wilde in the dock, by citing Richard Dellamora's argument in Masculine Desire that legal restrictions regarding sexuality in the late nineteenth
century changed emphasis from sexual acts between men especially sodomy, the traditional focus of legislation, to sexual sentiment or thought and
in this way to an abstract entity soon to be widely referred to as
'homosexuality'" (84). Auerbach asserts that modern film treatments of Dracula's erotic relationships with the female characters, Lucy and Mina, are often distortions of Stoker's emphasis on male homoeroticism.
The psychic vampires described in chapter three, characters in lesser
known works like Alice and Claude Askew's "Aylmer Vance and the Vampire" (1914), George Sylvester Viereck's The House of the Vampire (1907), Fritz
Leiber's "The Girl with the Hungry Eyes" (1949), Arthur Conan Doyle's "The
Parasite" (1894), and Mary E. Wilkins Freeman's "Luella Miller" (1903) "lurk
at the sophisticated center of adult society" (102). According to the cultural
values of author and audience, psychic vampires are more or less powerfully
masculine, perverse, marginal, and/or parasitically feminine. As Auerbach
notes, the Doyle and Freeman stories inextricably link psychic vampirism to
"womanly dependence," to the old maid and the helpless wife (107). Homosexual and female vampires of this type are more interested in soul stealing
than in bloodsucking. Without souls of their own, they hunger after others'.
The common characteristic of psychic vampires is that they "thrive on revulsion/' in violating common standards and revealing "the predatory tmderside of inspirational idealism" (109), for, as Auerbach so nicely puts it, "They
refuse blood but they grow fat on human friendship" (109).
In the second part of her argument concerning psychic vampires, Auerbach discusses more recent fictions that reproduce and revise the Dracula
tradition of "feeding" as alluring aesthetic representations. Moving from
analysis of Bela Lugosi's foreign appeal to a consideration of other
"captivating" monsters-Boris Karloff as Frankenstein's creature and King
Kong, Auerbach demonstrates how they represent" '30s hopes and fears" of
being foreign, formal, abnormal, and speechless (117). The 1960s Hammer
films of Dracula, while promoting the powers of the sun to enervate vampires, admiringly represent the material advantages of vampires and rebelliously offer images of domesticity and womanhood under seige. Just as the
Dracula myth presents new possibilities for the culture, historical events and
discoveries provide the opporttmity to reinterpret the myth: Raymond McNally and Radu Forescu's In search of Dracula (1972) linked the mythic vampire to the historical figure of Vlad Tepes, patriot and leader. The remainder
of the third chapter analyzes how the revisionist history of Dracula inspires
recent American film adaptations, notably Bram Stoker's Dracula (1973 TV
film starring Jack Palance), Dark Shadows (1966-71 TV series), and John Badham's Dracula (1979 starring Frank Langella). It is the fictions, usually those
by women, that reexamine how vampirism promotes cultural interpretation
and transformation; Auerbach looks at works by Chelsea Quinn Yarbro,
Suzy McKee Charnas, Anne Rice, Stephen King, and Tanith Lee in considering how their protagonists reconfigure vampirism under specific historical
conditions.
The fourth chapter of Our Vampires, Ourselves ambitiously weaves together
If
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socioeconomic and political analysis of the Reagan years with textual explication of Hollyvvood vampire movies and popular fiction of this period and
later. Auerbach regards Love at First Bite (1979) as "an authentic comic romance about vampires," while Vampire's Kiss (1989) and The Lost BOljs (1987)
reproduce 19805 tensions by acknowledging individual and social paralysis
and the inevitability of resisting oppression. Brian Stableford's The Empire of
feor (1988), Kim Newman's AllIlO DraCllla (1992), Anne Rice's Vampire Chronicles, Brian Aldiss's Dracula Ullbol//1(i (1991), and other fictions are invoked as
<1ttempts to explore "vampire inertia" (170), gender identity, and political
discontent in the age of AIDS.
TI1C last part of the chapter, and the book, build to a provocative argument
as Auerbach reinserts her personal experience into the narrative by relating
her observation of two particular presentations at a 1993 Irvine conference on
Quecr Theory. Sandy Stone's and Sue-Ellen Case's incantatory performances
represent problematic rlttempts to embody vampires and to reconstruct discourses of identity and body. Auerbach theorizes that "when reaction and
AIDS seemed to petrify the future, critics longed for impermanence: Queer
Theorists apotheosized a phantasmal, unsettled spirit. Even the countercultur,l\ v<1mpire is 8 product, if a resistant one, of its age" (184). After a brief
discussion of the role of Queer Theory in Jewelle Gomez's account of a black
lesbian vampire in The Gilda Stories (1993), an account that allows for "the recovcry of viJmpire homoeroticism" (186), Auerbach concludes her argument
with <1n analysis of Kathryn Bigelow's Near Dark, a vampire film that takes a
parodic look at macho violence in a Southwestern setting, although it ends
on iJ patriarchically comfortable and sentimentally conservative note when
the infected protagonist is successfully transfused, and therefore purified, by
hi~ \'ctcrinari,m f<1ther. Auerbach is typically sensitive to the mixed messages
convcyed: "If viJmpirism is a \\'asting disease like AIDS, its cure is a blessing, but if it conta.ins immorta.lity, secret strength, and forbidden identities,
its domcsticJtion is a death more painful than Homer's," the child vampire
\\'ho crie.:; out for wh<1t he can't hove as he shrivels and burns (192) .
...\ rccent Nctt' Yorker C<1rtoon (June 17, 1996) depicts two aging, welldressed men with fangs and capcs in convcrsation; one man says to the othL't', "Look, wc're three thousand years old. No one's going to hire us." What
till' c,lrtonnist Bruce Eric Kaplan acknowledges is that v<1mpires, like many
lltlll'rs in .m economy dominated by downsizing, have no future on the job
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We are always and irrevocably, it seems, in the era of the causal claim; the
allure of the neat, sequential logic of cause-and-effect always beckons. In a
world of semiotic fractures, literary expression is about its rhetoricity; in a
world constituted by historical exigencies, the text is about its implicated
status as context. But these predicated interpretations usually occur as a
function of a linear sequence: as in much psychoanalytic performance, for
example, causal origin is deduced from thematic connection, so that (to borrow a phrase from Frank Kermode's The Sense of an Ending), we who exist
"in the middest" may know ourselves and our cultural needs in the terms of
a coherent narrative. Structure-even narratives of structure's dislocation-is
all. Structure holds our attention, and explanation is what we all grasp after.
And for Patricia Meyer Spacks, the stimulation inherent in cultural expression is the effect of the boredom dynamic's cause. This explanatory narrative, then, will keep us wide awake into the long night of book reviewing.
Boredom: The Literary History of a State of Mind brilliantly opens up a space
in which to assess the critical phenomenon of descriptive narrative, even as
it treads ever so uneasily on its ground; that is, Boredom offers a compelling
reading not just of psychic alienation through the ages, but of its explanatory
force. And any motif that explains, that carries predictive power, must be
approached with the greatest caution. Fortunately, Spacks's pleasure in her
subject's ubiquity sacrifices very little to the facile even as it reveals the
trademark sign of its subject's menace. That is, in organizing a reading of
western culture since the eighteenth century around a negative reflex (the
need to counter dullness), it constructs a master narrative, a supremely fascinating insistence that its subject is so inclusive, it must be deeply implicated
in all cultural movement. The force of her narrative sequence must hold our
attention: what could be more urgent than the ghost that haunts our every
utterance, our every reading endeavour, our every effort to pay attention. Of
course nothing could be more urgent because such a rubric subsumes everything, which is as much to say that the causal history of boredom is here
posited as history. "All 'cultural advance' derives from the need to withstand boredom; literature is a single instance among many" (3). That is a tall
claim.
But then again, there is none among us who cannot claim to be exempt
from its force, and herein lies Spacks's marvellous resonance. Boredom raises
a frightening spectre because "readers' capacity to declare themselves uninvolved threatens the writer's project as it menaces their own pleasure. All literary endeavour occurs in a context of conceivable rejection" (2). One can
live with disagreement even with fiery opposition; but to recognize oneself
as boring is to have one's very existence effectively nullified, cancelled, not
worth even the energy of conscious rejection. The quest not to bore, then, becomes a quest for survival, but only of a sort. If I have ceased to exist for
you because my narratives put you to sleep, then I will find a place in which
I can exist, I will leave, but only to resurface in another space, or maybe only
in another form. Here, the reader nullifies the writer by declaring her too
dull; but then the writer threatens the intellectual and imaginative integrity
of the reader. With such dynamics in mind, Spacks traces an early nineteenth-century sensibility through Wordsworth's efforts to educate the public. Like many of his poetic peers, Wordsworth sought to make his readers
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pay attention to the wonderments precisely of the everyday and of the marginal. In rejecting the sensation literature of his time and in writing the Lyrical Ballads in a form of studied pedestrianism, "what is important is, or
should be, interesting, Wordsworth implicity argues, and conversely, what is
interesting should be important" (114). In this, the poet was turning to an
older meaning of the word "interest," one that equated the interesting with
the important. And where Spacks finds hints and glimmers of doubt in
Wordsworth's self-assurance, she is able to trace the emergence of a world in
which communal values can no longer be confidently posited. All the same,
in the Wordsworthian understanding here described, the responsibility to
read well is the responsibility to be fully human: "Failure to respond to his
text may imply human failure to respond to the needs and natures of others
perceived as unlike the self" (115). My disappearance, then, can only mean
your death to me. You are not an interesting listener if you can't stay awake.
Finding me boring attests to your inferior reading skills.
Indeed, the very history of boredom-which in this narrative, is also the
history of cultural advance since the eighteenth century-hinges upon the
development of constructions of selfhood and the development of notions of
subjectivity. Spacks deftly traces the ways in which the sexes "use" boredom
for and within different ends. For eighteenth-century women novelists, "to
constitute fiercely imposed misery as boredom's only alternative implies devious but intelligible social protest. The taken-for-granted probability of
boredom in a woman's life provides the starting point for narrative-and
perhaps for female anger" (62). In both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to be bored is to fail an essential test of human worth. By the nineteenth
century, however, its meaning-especially for women-has somewhat
changed. In a virtuosic reading of Maria Edgeworth's Helen (1834), Spacks
observes that the characters portrayed as bored "fail not in thought but in
feeling. Feeling attests character. The good woman's primary interest in
other people demonstrates appropriate emotional orientation" (181). And
then thinking of the implicit stance of muted protest in characters portrayed
in Austen, Edgeworth and Charlotte Bronte, she concludes that "what they
resist is the social prohibition for women of many forms of meaningful
action. The struggle against boredom is one consequence of such prohibition .... Misguided or conventional in form, their resistance helps constitute
their characters and the plots that contain them" (189).
Before the eighteenth century individuals got bored or were repulsed by
tedium, to be sure; however, such responses were theorized in the terms of
apathy, and more importantly, in the terms of a spiritual malaise that threatened the personal responsibility of the disengaged creature. Personal responSibility remains a vital motif into the eighteenth century, but it speaks to a
differently inflected understanding of experience. It is a concentration on
such inflections that focuses Spacks's historical narrativizing. For the eighteenth-century organization of the work force, and its concomitant increase
in "leisure time," exposed a separation of work and leisure that humankind
simply had not known before. Furthermore, with the decline of orthodox
Christianity as the central ethic of society, individual rights, especially the
right to pursue happiness as an individual, becomes paramount. The rise of
individualism, according to Spacks's careful calibrations, coincides with the
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consciousness-and therefore with the cultural history-of the threat of boredom.
Spacks's tone in this book, though often witty and certainly engaged (engagement, of course, being the very opposite of boredom) is not hysterical;
she is interested in a social history that reveals as much about our changing
conceptions of the social as it does about the recording of history. She does
not take us through an overview of the existential agonies of expression or
the crises of reception: fear of dullness is no Bloomean angst or submerged
and displaced political manoeuvre. Instead, it is an all pervasive scaffolding
on which hang the structural materials of modernity.
Spacks is a subtle reader, and so her historical narrative does not merely
reduce culture to a progressive terror of inattentiveness. We must be clear
about this, as such projects as hers are vulnerable to misrepresentation. For
the most part, she bears this vulnerability well. As both cultural construct
and cultural by-product, boredom's history raises urgent questions about
our own historicity: as the author is at pains to point out, the social history
of boredom is a history of how taste is constituted, of how importance and
significance are deSignated, and of how ultilnate value (as shifting a concept
as that is) is articulated in the very announcement of what interests. If the
eighteenth-century individual saw boredom as an ethical and moral flaw,
one that must be remedied for the sake of the salvation of the individual
soul as much as for its postulated community, then something crucially important is revealed about the status of shared values and communal norms.
The postmodern condition of boredom, on the other hand, is in fact the aptest metaphor of our own age. In Spacks's reading, "Boredom as universal
explanation and complaint reveals the scope of tvventieth-century entitlement: Calvin's sense of a right to adventures, the teenager's right to 'be with
friends every single minute,' the housewife's right to mental stimulation"
(260).

I

We have a right to stimulation: this, at least, we know. For in an age of
discontinuities and generalized uncertainty, one marked by "the end of history," the history we know ourselves to be sharing seems to be one in which
we are bored but do not want to be. Hence the proliferation of critical and
historical narratives of strange excitement, of academic books announcing an
ultimate substratum of powerful force repressed beneath the fabric of quotidian complacency. We may be staid, repetitive, monotonous. We may produce too many books that tell our new secrets to ourselves. But our
monotony is only the obverse of our sublimated Dionysian frenzy. Psychoanalysis, Romanticism's great gift to modernity, tells a story in which boredom masks aggression, in which it tells of a state of "instinctual tension"
seeking an endlessly deferred release. Our very boredom (so the story goes)
is thereby a subject that explains our deep selves, and our deep selves are of
course very interesting.
Boredom as an organizing motif around which the development of modern culture can be studied is therefore compelling. Everyone should read this
book, not least because it could not possibly bore. But as surely as boredom
and its resistance can organize a cultural reading, so can desire. Likewise
with belief, subjectivity, will to power, and more insistently these days, politics. This is not to suggest that Spacks is unaware of the responsiveness of
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her boredom project to any of these issues. Still, it will be worthwhile to bear
in mind that she has chosen boredom as a heuristic, and that her explanations sometimes work better as descriptions. This is not to cancel the effectiveness of those descriptions in providing a glimpse of humanity's
development; it is only to caution that when description is converted into
explanation, something more than just cultural history is going on. Cultural
history, that is, is being constituted in the effort to define self-expression as a
profoundly publiC fact. The particular history here given speaks to our present preoccupation with the status of communal norms, and the way in which
their complexities may be made coherent-and therefore interesting-by becoming part of a sequential narrative. Boredom is a very welcome contribution to the community (academic) that labours alone and longs to speak to
something other than the void. We are all, then, in Spacks's debt: our most
private meditations respond, however subtly, to a collective ethic of human
rapport, one in which to speak and to hear are continuous with the quest to
engage in the highest endeavours of the creation of meaning.
University of Toronto

Karen A. Weisman

Paper Bullets: Print and Kingship under Charles II by Harold M. Weber. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1996. Pp. 302. $39.95.

Anticipating Michael McKeon's recent call to "historicize patriarchy," Harold Weber's Paper Bullets addresses two abiding disciplinary interests among
scholars of the "long" eighteenth century: the emergence of print culture and
the gendering of political authority. Only with the combined pressure of new
historicism and cultural studies, though, has the field come to see these two
interests as intimately imbricated. And it is to this newly recognized intersection that Paper Bullets seeks to speak. Weber contends, here, that "The
transformation of the English monarchy during the seventeenth century was
not simply played out against a backdrop of changes in the production, marketing, and consumption of printed matter, but was itself part of these
changes" (5). In support of his contention, Weber offers his readers a commanding array of archival evidence including proclamations, statutes, pamphlets and trial transcripts, which compellingly document the crown's active
manipulation of the Restoration press as vehicle for its own power. And for
scholars of the period wishing to deepen their understanding of this particular aspect of Restoration political culture Paper Bullets holds much of interest.
Weber's project proceeds through five chapters conceptually organized
around the book's two themes: "Representations of the King" and "The Language of Censorship," with the later section offering some of the most interesting evidence of Weber's central argument, particularly in terms of the
crown's creation of authorship as a legal fiction through which it could more
effectively control seditious print. But Paper Bullets also labors under conceptual inconsistencies and a kind of historical inattention that often makes its
central argument dubious and the final two chapters' incisive payoff too
long in coming.
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Paper Bullets begins by meticulously and promisingly laying the groundwork for its investigation, deftly noting that "The implementation of the Restoration settlement inevitably revealed the unresolved tensions that had
divided the nation during its mid-century upheavals, and created new conflicts as well" (14). Sadly, it does not fulfill its promise to give readers a
more subtle and attentive account of Restoration political culture's internal
tensions, nor does it clearly articulate the conceptual relationship between
Stuart patriarchalism and emergent capitalism.
Paper Bullets' first section amplifies the disciplinary commonplace that
Charles II's Restoration carried with it the full reinstatement of Stuart patriarchalism by adding to the familiar catalogue of high cultural representations an extensive repertoire of popular culture representations. But to a
large degree this ground has already been covered by Tim Harris' meticulous work on London crowd culture. Moreover, Weber's approach to this
particular facet of Restoration life lacks Harris' deft attention to complicating
matters of party and class. Regrettably, Weber drops his analysis of the
crown's relationship to the populace, which was for this reader one of the
most enticing promises Paper Bullets makes in its introduction, in favor of
heavily formalist analyses of escape narratives. For despite the often meticulous readings of this popular subgenre and his salient recognition that these
tales of Charles II's delivery were clearly deployed as Royalist propaganda,
Weber's formalist hermeneutic leads him to collapse important historical distinctions. Thus, for instance, we find no distinction made behveen A Chronicle of the Kings of England published in 1670 after the London fire and two
Dutch wars, when public sentiment was beginning to be disgruntled with
crown military and economic policy and had become more cohesive in its
anti-Catholicism, and earlier versions of the escape narratives published during the Restoration's first blush. Although there may have been little formal
difference between these narratives, they were almost certainly deployed to
different effecl.
Readers will find the second and third chapters vexed by similar conceptual inconsistencies. Focusing on the monarch's sacred and profane bodies,
Paper Bullets' topic seems to slip away from Weber here in two chapters that
should be pivotal to his argument and that take up material both relevant to
the period and provocatively indicative of the way Restoration culture conceptualized monarchical power. In the first of these chapters Weber discusses the crown's strategic employment of the royal touch to heal scrofula
and argues that almost as soon as printing gained currency it instrumentally
expanded the public theater in which these rituals took place by codifying
and disseminating representations of the crown's miraculous and divine
power. The problem is that this ritual, though used by Charles II, was on the
wane and, according to Weber, by the early eighteenth-century was regularly subjected to medical skepticism. Weber's central contention, here, that
print "contributed to [royal healing's] assumption of a standard, durable,
and invariable shape" (56), falls apart and looks like an anachronistic characterization since if permanence is an irreducible conceptual characteristic of
print culture, we should expect those public rituals in whose permanence
print was instrumental to be on the ascendancy in the same way that print
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culture itself was during this period. Clearly, the King's body did not undergo such a transformation.
But perhaps the most disappointing chapter in Paper Bullets is the third, in
which Weber discusses print culture's role in undercutting the crown's claim
to divine right and patrilineal succession by proliferating pornographic representations of Charles II. Ostensibly, "The Monarch's Profane Body" promises to investigate the prevailing constructions of masculinity and the often
subtle versions of sexual potency that underwrote patriarchalism. Weber
notes a good portion of the historical work done on early modern sodomitical culture by Randolph Trumbach and others, but that work remains troublingly unintegrated (relegated to a note) and fails to include Stephen
Zwicker's important work on Restoration patriarchalism in Lines of Authority.
Most troublingly, this chapter anachronistically conflates sodomitical culture
with homosexual masculinity. But beyond the historical inconsistencies,
"The Monarch's Profane Body" doesn't do what it is poised so well to do
brilliantly, namely bring the recent insights of gender theory to bear on Restoration political configurations of Stuart patriarchalism.
Paper Bullets' second section constitutes a marked departure from its first
section. Here we see the impressive erudition and trenchant historical insight
which the book's first section seemed to promise but failed to deliver, but
which its author is eminently capable of supplying. Weber's overall argument would have been considerably more accessible and more convincing
had he chosen to start his project with the fourth chapter which so lucidly
exposes the triple intersection between gender, political power and print culture. At last turning to consider the press' polemical role in its own censorship, Weber elucidates the Stationers Company's transmogrifying
relationship to Restoration law. Although "The Feminine Part of Every Rebellion" often blurs lines between legal authorities implying, for instance,
that a 1680 judicial decision reaffirming the King's right to "prohibit all unlicensed newsbooks and pamphlets" (151) manifested crown authoritarianism,
when in fact the appeal to "civil order" dearly invokes the constitutive principle of common law. Here I was disappointed only because a subtler touch
would have allowed Weber to draw out the provocative insight that by the
1680's crown authority actively manipulated common law to bolster its besieged political authority, while in the first years of the Restoration Royalist
propagandists habitually repudiated common law as the legal foundation of
Parliamentarianism.
Weber's concluding chapter brings Paper Bullets into focus by investigating
Stephen College's treason trial in Oxford. Providing a valuable perspective
on print culture's complex relationship to political authority, Weber wisely
emphasizes two points too seldom missing from other investigations of this
problematic: print culture was not limited to London, and at this early juncture in its development the political stakes of print's cultural commentary
were often fatally high for printers, publishers, and authors alike.
With sensitivity to its conceptual inconsistencies, Paper Bullets is on the
whole, I think, a book worth reading for its historical work. Weber marshals
an impressive array of primary materials in support of his investigation and
in the book's concluding section those materials are sharply and incisively
focused. Paper Bullets' major liability is the weakness of its conceptual frame,
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which only comes into focus during the last two chapters, hampering its investigation of Restoration kingship and detracting somewhat from the massive historical work of the first section. Weber's argument here will and
should provoke further conversation and increased attention to a vitally important conceptual constellation in early modern political culture.
Melissa Mowry

University of Delaware

The Pleasures of Virtue: Political Thought in the Novels of Jane Austen by Anne
Crippen Ruderman. Lanham, MO: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995. Pp. ix + 202.
$21.95 paper, $57.50 cloth.

At this time when Jane Austen's stock is up, way up, Anne Crippen Ruderman's The Pleasures of Virtue reminds us why Austen's novels continue to
please both close readers and viewing audiences of film adaptations. Austen
repeatedly identifies, explains, and illustrates the pleasures of virtue through
consideration of heroes and heroines who find noble thoughts and activities
pleasant. First among these noble things is attachment to othersf lovef the
tip-top of Keatsfs Ifpleasure thermometer in Endymiol1f culminating in marriage in Austen's novels. But love is not all that constitutes happiness, for
happiness naturally ensues for the morally virtuous, not as an inevitable reward but as an accident of the way Jane Austen's world works.
The old arguments of self versus society or self-interest versus community
building that have encouraged recent critics to factor Kant into Austen's
framework are put to rest while Aristotle's classical moderation becomes the
ideal: "Austen, like Aristotle, implies that the pleasures of self-control are
the truest pleasures" (8). Ruderman repeatedly recognizes that we have no
evidence that Austen read Aristotle or his commentators, though, deep in
the heart of her argument, she admits parenthetically that "It is tempting to
say that Austen looks at the world in the way Aristotle does but from the
perspective of a woman" (143). The specific virtues, suggested by Aristotle
and fictionally illuminated by Austen, are prudence, sensibility, justice,
proper pride, modesty, and moderation, the last being the key to Aristotle's
definition of moral virtue: A mean that lies between two vicesf one of exthe mean is the most praiseworthy
cess and the other of deficiency .
state." Through moderation of deep feeling by self-command, Jane Austen
defends the enduring possibility of a human life that both benefits others
and perfects oneself. Somewhat surprisingly, Ruderman notes that happiness
is not dependent on marriage but on living a measured life of virtue acquired by habit; marriage follows naturally from a love that is salutary for
society as well as for individuals because it is grounded on the virtue aimed
at by both.
Ruderman provides a credible and creditable corrective not only to the
new historicist approach that aims to locate in Austen's novels more politics
than propriety but also to the feminist approach that converts relationships
into gendered power plays. But because she is alert to both approaches, Ruderman controls her own argument by finding the precise mean between
U
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these extreme views. Pitting Aristotle against Kant and Wollstonecraft
against Rousseau, Ruderman reasserts a balance that has been lost in the
rush of current arguments about Jane Austen as historian or as feminist or
even, in the flap over Terry Castle's London Review of Books review of Deirdre
Le Fay's edition of Jane Austen's Letters, as lesbian. jane Austen remains in
Ruderman's good judgment a novelist and a moralist, whose heroes and heroines acquire happiness because they have and continue to cultivate moral
virtue.
This is no book for janeites, those who love jane Austen more than they
understand her. Each of the four long chapters considers all of the novels,
almost at once, so that occasionally the sensibilities of one capture the sense
of another: "Frank [Churchill in Emma] might be asked the same question
that Elinor Dashwood asks Lucy Steele in Sense and Sensibility after hearing
of her engagement to Edward: has she any plan for marriage 'but that of
waiting for Mrs. Ferrars' death, which is a melancholy and shocking
extremity'" (55 148). Frank Churchill knows no Mrs. Ferrars, of course, and a
paraphrase of the point might serve better than does the quotation. When
arguing for firmness of principle in heroines, Ruderman appropriates without credit Edmund's definition of FaIU1Y Price, who is "firm as a rock in her
own principles" (MP 351), as though equal to jane Bennet who is, by the narrator's definition, "firm when she felt herself to be right" (P&P 59). But despite the copious quotation from the novels, Ruderman never loses sight of
her own argument on the pleasures of virtue.
She proceeds systematically through education in virtue, where the focus
is principally on Emma and Northanger Abbey to consideration of particular
virtues. As she proceeds, she reconsiders why Mr. Knightley and Emma
Woodhouse are a more suitable match than are Frank Churchill and jane
Fairfax, and why Emma does not choose jane as her particular friend. The
gallant Frank and elegant jane have "a kind of selfishness that keeps them
from being the true hero and heroine of the novel" (28). Emma's openness is
preferred to jane's reserve, Mr. Knightley's frankness and sensitivity to
Frank's mysterious secretiveness. To be hero or heroine each must have
taste, and taste is, in Austen's reckoning, what Austen often calls delicacy,
"an ability to take pleasure in principled behavior" (37). The best characters
take pleasure in the very act of reSisting or overcoming their feelings, and
the best characters always rise to be heroes and heroines.
Being hospitable, friendly, courteous, urbane, and open requires taste, and
Henry and Eleanor Tilney demonstrate impeccable taste in contrast to the
self-aggrandizing Thorpes. But the Thorpes are not villains so much as not
virtuous. john Thorpe is unscrupulous, and Isabella is dangerously flirtatious; neither is worth Catherine Morland's friendship, even before she
learns to think for herself. Unworthy of happiness, of lasting attachment, of
love, the Thorpes lack sufficient virtue, and concern for virtue is the root of
the capacity to love (49).
Love is based on friendship and friendship is, according to Aristotle and
Austen alike, based on virtue rather than on pleasure or utility. Emma and
Mr. Knightley, like Catherine and Henry Tilney, will stay together because
they see virtues in each other. Marriage follows naturally when choosing a
supportive friend for a life of continued perfection of virtues. Marriage
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brings less duty than mutual growth. Self-sufficiency gives way to love, and
love results in happiness. Emma and Mr. Knightley feel something "so like
perfect happiness, that it could bear no other name" (E 432).
Blake says that "Prudence is a rich old maid courted by incapacity," but to
Aristotle, a prudent man can" deliberate well concerning what is good and
expedient for himself, not with respect to a part ... but for living well in
general" (76). A prudent woman of Austen's definition requires considerably
more complex elucidation. Ruderman links Anne Elliot of Persuasion, Fanny
Price of Mansfield Park, and Elinor Dashwood of Sense and Sensibility, all of
whom have strong sensibilities, keen self-awareness, and old-fashioned
prudence. All three lose their childhood homes and must move on amid
family and acquaintances who do not wholly understand them. All succeed
because all have a respect for propriety, an aspect of prudence, and because
all have deference and discretion consistent with good taste and fine judgment. Just because a pattern or practice is conventional does not make it
right, but often "respect for convention is more reasonable than defiance of it"
(emphasis Ruderman's, 69). Elinor has more freedom of thought than Marianne; her self-control is greater than her self-indulgence. Elinor's self-control, "far from being lack of feeling, increases with her feeling" (emphasis
Ruderman's 71). All of Austen's work argues that the "exercise of reason and
virtue [is] a fulfillment of human nature, not a pruning of it" (emphasis Ruderman's 71). The added emphases in these sentences may shout the argument Ruderman wishes to make, but her point is ably made without the
shouting.
Good marriages in Austen's novels are not based on money or security,
and true love is not based solely on sexual attraction. Marianne Dashwood's
often criticized marriage to Colonel Brandon is a match of the "same kind of
romantic sensibility" (emphasis Ruderman's 79) that characterizes the match
of Louisa Musgrove and Captain Benwick; both couples are grateful for
being loved by someone else and both couples find happiness in marriages
that show that "imprudence leads to a greater dependence on such conventions [as marriage] than does prudence" (79) ..
Analysis of one virtue does not excuse Ruderman from reconsidering familiar arguments about the possible lack of virtue or success of characterization. Fanny Price, passive and priggish to some readers, provides Rudennan
a perfect opportunity for rereading character. Fanny marries Edmund Bertram for love and for virtue which each facilitates and encourages in the
other. Fanny's childlike innocence coupled with a tough spirit that makes
her constant in her longing for virtue for herself and others more than compensates for her passivity and inwardness. She has both a desire for and a
vision of virtue that earns her heroine status and final happiness. Yet she is
neither smug nor self-righteous. Deftly and carefully leaving unsaid that it is
wicked to marry one person while loving another, Fanny typifies moderation
in her speech, behavior, and even in her gratitude for Edmund's eventual
proposal.
Fanny and Edmund, cousins and nearly siblings in late childhood and adolescence, raise the spectre of sibling love rivalling that of conjugal love.
Ruderman enters this battle eagerly, seeing the issue first from the perspective of women's friendship and then of sisters, one for another, and finally of
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sister for brother. She moderates betvveen the extremes with as deft a control
as Austen herself, lodging in explanatory footnotes her awareness of all the
arguments that have bent the texts to accommodate ideological readings,
misprisions, and exaggerated claims.
Whether or not Austen knew Aristotle's various dicta on virtue, Rousseau's on education, or Wollstonecraft's on the rights of women, she illustrates again and again the pleasures of virtue, distinguishing proprieties
from manners, judgment from conventions, and proper pride from egotism.
Mr. Darcy and Mr. Knightley, often accused of being proud, are appropriately high-minded, properly proud of their virtue, representing a mean between extremes of excessive modesty and vanity. Being neither social nor
concerned with what others think of them, Mr. Darcy and Mr. Knightley
speak less than they act, and they act for others rather than for themselves.
Virtue rather than money and power sets off these heroes and earns them
the gratitude of men and women alike. Religion undergirds the morality of
Austen's heroes and heroines, but virtue is never solely a matter of religious
faith or dogmatic obedience, not even in Persuasion or Mansfield Park, the
most explicitly religious of Austen's novels. Individual morality supersedes
evangelical or Anglican fervor, for virtue or its lack is practiced devotedly
not devoutly. Moderation even in religion makes for happiness on earth.
The Pleasures of Virtue elucidates jane Austen's characters in opposition to
the prevailing political thought of Austen's time. But the result is a timeless
exposition of the human capacity for reason and virtue that leads to happiness, to the principal pleasures of life. Being constant to principles may require self-sacrifice, but none of Austen's heroes or heroines are saints.
Instead they are decidedly human, courageous in speech, generous in action,
and rewarded by happiness for having virtue. This essay is a fine study of
moderation and a promising first book from a scholar who practices the
moderation Jane Austen herself endorses.
Smith College

Patricia L. Skarda

The 'Lucy Poems': A Case Study in Literary Knowledge by Mark jones. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1995. Pp. 336. $55.00.

The subtitle of Mark jones's new book, "A Case Study," is something of
misnomer in that it does not merely illuminate a specific problem in literary
knowledge, it sheds light on the entire field of literary study. If Wordsworth's lyrics about or over the subject of "Lucy" provide a site of interpretive doubt rather than knowledge, and therefore offer an ideal locus for the
study jones undertakes, these lyrics (as well as their interpretive history)
also provide the impetus for a thoughtful re-situation of the interpretive imperative and its consequences. The 'Lucy Poems': A Case Study in Literary
Knowledge is for this alone a remarkable book; but for Wordsworthians it will
also prove a dense and richly rewarding one. It is, in fact, one of those rare
books that provokes in the reader the wish to have written it him- or herself.
The question that initiates the problem is: why are we so invested in the
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'Lucy Poems'? But certainly a more primary question grounds it: how did
the 'Lucy' grouping come to be the present one, since it is not Wordsworth's
own? 111€se questions together structure the problem: the editorial investment is not entirely separable from the critical investment, both of which respond to but are not the inevitable projection of authorial investment. It is
the very mystery that the 'Lucy Poems' represent that allows different claims
to materialize around them, to turn the insubstantial into a centering and
iconic keystone for the field. The 'Lucy Poems' are important to literary
studies not because they are so very good, but because so much can be read
into them, a richness that was certainly intended by their author but which
is often broadened to even greater critical, philosophical, and literary weight
and substance. Mark Jones sets up his case study to comprehend the historical as well as the present reception of the 'Lucy Poems,' their grouping and
currently accepted ordering, and their uses for critical interpretation and
theory.
Wordsworth's 'Lucy Poems' became cemented during the mid-nineteenth
century as consisting of the following poems in the following and familiar
order: "Strange fits of passion," "She dwelt among th' untrodden ways," "I
travelled among unknown men," "Three years she grew in sun and shower,"
and" A slumber did my spirit sea!." These five poems provide, along with
Keats's six odes and Coleridge's conversation poems, the touchstones of
Romantic period studies, the poems we can teach to our students as embodying the mystery and artistry of the literary imagination. These are our
disciplinary fascinations, love affairs that we transfer to students often without the accompanying reasons that justify such passion. And this is a compounded and textured love we hold for these works, composed of what our
own teachers have taught us about loving texts as much as of what we ourselves have discovered. The loyalties multiplied in our literary passions can
be too cherished for us to want to question or analyze their cost basis, and so
it is fortunate that Jones sets about demystifying them and their attraction
for us. Because we can no longer uphold the kind of Victorian and early
Modern purviews that reified and biographically identified the artwork,
those projects that first endowed the 'Lucy' grouping with such value, we
need to understand the history and the context of those earlier projects, and
consequently the condition of our literary love. "The important question, finally, is not whether a given grouping is right, but what the readerly activity
invited by Wordsworth's text can reveal about the functions of both provocation and response" (12). The puzzle is a considerable one: these are poems
that discourse about interpersonal love but that are tacitly about artistic love,
evoke textual love from their readers. How vulnerable are we to this triangtllated passion, one which is the mediated product of generations of editors, scholars, theorists-in short, an institutional rather than purely poetic
feat? And what do the institutional conditions of this love cost us, particularly at the intellectual level?
Jones argues that our relation to the 'Lucy' texts, a relation I have been assigning an affective nature although he does not, is a case in point of "the
modem literature institution's will to knowledge." The 'Lucy Poems,' that is,
open themselves up in such a way that they demand interpretive intervention, thus facilitating the process of "legitimat[ing] 'English' as a 'discipline'
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capable of producing 'knowledge,'" because the indeterminacies of the
'Lucy' texts were always suppressed through the interpretive process in order to produce such knowledge. Put another way, our affective relation to
the 'Lucy Poems' has such power over us because the cost basis is integral to
the value of our discipline; we love the thing that has the power to grant our
activity institutional, social, and political value; we love to expend its richness to both taste that power and the lovely mystery of its suppressed articulation. On the other hand, the indeterminacies of the 'Lucy' texts also give us
some pain since they will not reduce to sheer knowledge, and the more freedom we allow ourselves interpretively over these texts, as Jones points out,
the less we are able to contain and define our 'knowledge.'
Jones not only engages the enigma of the 'Lucy Poems' in itself and within
criticism, but he broadens the problem to the academy by wondering how
the sociopolitical critique of the institution today by a critic like Terry Eagleton, for instance, takes into account the historical reception of the 'Lucy
Poems.' These were poems composed in a period that saw the "Rise of English as a modem institution, but it also [saw] the rise of 'theory' and considerable changes in the specific practices of criticism," and Jones urges that
these three be viewed not disparately as Eagleton does, but "as cognate
functions" that sit in relation to larger social contexts, particularly democratizing ones (55). So, too, the change in the early judgmental and analytic Reviews to the more subjective and interpretive Magazines of the nineteenth
century might perhaps map out a similar critical response to literature today
as we ourselves move between interpretation and analysis in our critical
writing; moreover, the shift "epitomizes the liberalization of 'the institution
of criticism' since the romantic period" (59). The recurrences, fascinating as
they are, that the case study of Lucy reveals in institutional practice, rationale, and self-propagation, are spun out not in order to refute Eagleton but to
set him straight. As valuable as this is for us (and as much as we might wish
him to push it further), Jones confines his critique to clearing the ground for
his study of Lucy, subjugating it to her.
But who is Lucy? That, finally, becomes the centering question for Jones,
and it is the one that causes him most trouble in this otherwise elegant book.
As he points out, Lucy cannot be the grandmotherly figure of "Dear Child of
Nature" with her "old age serene and bright"; whether a young woman or a
child, she must be eternally young. Representing the immortality of youth,
Lucy signifies (or perhaps is) that quality of the child that makes death inconceivable. Or, she Signals the youth in immortality as represented by one
who dies young. Both of these conceptualizations of death or not-death are
vessels for the mystery we weave about life and spirit by way of an emotional nexus that allows us to bind these into some kind of certitude that is
strong enough to contain mystery and doubt, but at a distance. Lucy is the
container for this certitude and this doubt in the Wordsworthian canon;
Keats's odes and Coleridge's conversation poems offer more formal, less figurative kinds of containers. But the figure is an extremely powerful medium,
which is what allows critics to go beyond the authorial project of the 'Lucy'
poems. The pre-sexual being, in this case the female with her cultural connotations for the desiring reader, represents potential rather than experience,
and because of this convention we accept Wordsworth's consignment of this
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mystery to the young girl-whose figurative or literal death is the only way
to stabilize the mystery she contains.
So far so good, but Jones never fully accounts for the substantive difference between the 'Lucy' figure of the five editorially agreed-upon poems of
the 'Lucy' grouping, and the young girls caught in a similar life-death nexus
in poems Jones mentions as near 'Lucy' poems such as "Louisa," Among all
lovely things my Love had been," and "Lucy Gray." Nor does he account for
why certain poems are not considered in the context of the elusive 'Lucy'
quality, such as "We Are Seven," with its similar death-enmeshed maiden,
"'Tis said that some have died for love," where the speaker and maiden are
more fully realized figures and the title is very similar in tone, or even liThe
Sparrow's Nest"-for given the sheer weight of consideration placed on the
Lucy configuration, it is not enough to dismiss a poem from consideration
for using a name other than "Lucy." That is to say, the 'Lucy Poems' sit at
the center of an economic circulation of desire and mystery that we value
over thought and analysis. Obviously, it was never Jones's task or intention
to discover other 'Lucy' poems, but we need to understand even more
clearly just why these five poems and no others belong to the canonical
grouping. I do not argue with Jones's conclusions, but rather with his not
helping us understand clearly enough why we are so wed to these particular
lyrics and no others.
Another difficulty arises out of this first one. Although Jones does call
"Louisa" a "borderer" poem to the 'Lucy' grouping, he doesn't pay enough
attention to borderers themselves-neither the border poems to the Lucy
grouping and what they have to tell us, nor to the border quality of Lucy
herself. Nor does he consider the "Border" geography that the Lake District
neighbors, or even the border state of alien subjectiVity that both William
and Dorothy Wordsworth experienced during their ghastly winter in Goslar.
Wordsworth's play The Borderers, even if only by its title, should be a pointer
to these other considerations.
Finally, what leads Jones to ignore the importance of the border modality
i is his refusal to engage psychological or psychoanalytic critical theories, and
, he therefore ignores the psychological properties of the Wordsworthian
imagination-not in terms of the psychobiographical, which he rightly, I
think, rejects, but in terms of understanding border states, border beings,
and Wordsworth's own projections of the imaginative imperative. It is his
resistance of this aspect of the social that leads Jones to misread a crucial
passage in Geoffrey Hartman's Wordsworth's Poetry, 1878-1814 which dis" cusses border modalities and which, had Jones allowed it, would have shed
1
light on the irksome question of Lucy's ontology. Jones finds Hartman's
i analysis to be "wavering" because he does not name a physically real Lucy,
but what Jones refuses to take seriously is Hartman's reference to Lucy as an
"intermediate" or "boundary being." "This wavering [between 'being' and
'modality']," Jones remarks, "might be supposed to wean us from strictly
I
biographical identifications" (88). But Hartman's point is that once we come
to view the poems more familiarly, we see that she is not a being so much as
a "modality" who has the potential to remain spirit, or to become humanized much in the same way that the emergent poet has the choice of becoming a practicing poet or of letting his creative self die off in an easy death in
II

308

Criticism, Vol. XXXIX, no. 2: Book Reviews

nature. This question of a psychologically comprehensible intermediacy is
very much related to the formal question of poems that are intermediary to
the 'Lucy' grouping. Wordsworth was clearly very interested in the concept
of border states, whether physical, formal, psychological, or spiritual. Clearly, Jones uses Hartman in this passage on Lucy to show how the institutional
imperative co-opts criticism, but to dismiss the question is not only reductive, it limits the insight of Jones's very accomplished institutional critique.
Clearly Jones has invested in the physical and social rather than psychological (or psychic) reality of Lucy; by subjugating everything in his study to
her, he buys into her reality in a way that Eagleton might well criticize in return.

My complaints about Jones's refusal to take the border state seriously
should not be taken as any reason not to read and deeply appreciate this
book. Jones is very generous with his insights, offering nearly one per page.
Wordsworthians should read this book: for those who are not and never will
be Wordsworth enthusiasts or specialists, this book offers an institutional
history and critique that can be widely applied within literary studies, and
that is worth reading for its own sake.
Univ. of Massachusetts-Boston

Elizabeth Pay

Feminist Conversations: Fuller, Emerson, and the Play of Reading by Christina
Zwarg. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995. Pp. x + 302. $39.95 cloth;
$16.95 paper.
Margaret Fuller is best remembered for her influence on others and her
conversation rather than for her writing. The tendency among feminists today is to resurrect Fuller's literary writings, but except for Woman in the
Nineteenth Century, her writings are not memorable. Much of it, particularly
Summer on the Lakes, is slow reading embellished with examples of her vast
frame of reference and excellent education (which she liked to flaunt). Puller's poetry is flat and her lines are apt to be stilted. Puller does not really
know how to tell a story, which is why her writing is most accessible in her
journalism and literary reviews. Fuller said that as a Transcendentalist, "she
had an active mind frequently busy with large topics" (Letter 1837 to Caroline Sturgis). This is aptly descriptive. For Fuller, conversation was a congenial means for self-expression; for Ralph Waldo Emerson, her most famous
friend, conversation was an outgrowth of the sermon and the inherent style
of the familiar essay at which he was adept. One could say that they both
thought in conversation, but Emerson wrote his out, while Fuller spoke hers,
and lost them in air. The loss is ours, and I especially wish that Fuller were
available on video tape or CD Rom.
For twenty-five years, feminists and other readers of American literature
have been carefully analyzing Fuller's literature and personal correspondence trying to place her in a context showing her importance as writer, theorist, and influence. Christina Zwarg finds fault with some literary critics
who, she says, have not taken Fuller as seriously as she does, but her study
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Feminist Conversations hits the right chords and "seriously" examines Fuller's
impact. Her thesis is that Fuller's thought and writing was a determined attempt to gain power by embracing opportunities not open to women, to
break from tradition, and to reduce the trappings of patriarchy: in short to
see, feel, and think like a woman. It is difficult to get at Fuller's genius without discussing her life, and because Zwarg's discussion of Fuller's life is
scanty, Fuller's invigorating and often unpredictable personality is largely
absent.
Fuller was the editor of Dial (1839-1842), the best and most effective conduit for American Transcendentalism. After leaving the editorship, she traveled and produced Summer on the Lakes (1844), which led to a job as literary
critic at Horace Greeley's New-York Tribune (1844-1846). Fuller opted for independence, and moved to New York, where she produced her best, if not
most vivacious, writings-approximately 250 reviews and general social criticism. Additionally, she worked at recomposing Woman in the Nineteenth Century (1845) and collected her reviews in Papers on Literature and Art (1846).
Given her death at age 40, she was astonishingly productive, a dynamo of
sorts. But her writing is often just not that good. Zwarg puts it rather clumsily when she says that Fuller tried to liberate "her genius from the artifice of
artistic character by negotiating a new understanding of the relationship between public and private worlds, indeed by negotiating a shift away from
the unsatisfactory categories of artist and genius together" (254).
Zwarg attempts to broaden our awareness of Fuller's achievement by devoting considerable space to Fuller's youthful works: her translation of J. W.
Goethe's Torquato Tasso (completed in 1835) and Bettina von Arnim's Gunderode (1842). Zwarg thinks that these works are undervalued, for Fuller provides a "feminist component to translation" through which she set out to
change the literary and cultural systems of her time. This argument asks for
too much leniency. Fuller's essay "Bettine Brentano [von Arnim] and her
Friend Gilnderode," published in Dial (1842) tells much about her relationship with Emerson and less about von Arnim's relationship with Goethe,
whom she idolized. Fuller rejected the classic hierarchical male/female relationship. This was the signature of her feminism, and she used this argument in her "Conversations," the lecture series that she was conducting in
Boston at this time. Later, she developed this argument effectively in Woman
in the Nineteenth Century. Zwarg tries hard to make a strong case for Fuller's
feminist translations, but one can also argue that translation was a dead end
for Fuller, since both the Tasso and the Gunderode were left unfinished and
unpublished in her lifetime.
Zwarg deepens the linkage between Fuller and Emerson:
Fuller met Emerson as he was pulling away from the church, renouncing the power of the clergy. At that point, she appeared to be moving
in the opposite direction, attempting to gain power by embracing opportunities normally closed to women. But this reading is a superficial
account of their difference .... Both were determined to break from
tradition and both tended to define the break in linguistic terms; Emerson rejected the limited tropes of Christianity and Fuller rejected the
limited tropes of society .... both maintained a faith in the subversive
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powers of the literary text to support their goal. The problem came
when he [Emerson] had to reconcile their shared aspirations with the
grammar of sexual and gender difference as it was managed by the
culture. (41-42)
Zwarg shows, successfully on the whole, how Fuller's friendship and the
letters to him charged Emerson's imagination. They met in 1836; Fuller was
26 and Emerson was 33. He was then completing Nature, and there followed
a personal and epistolary relationship that lasted until Fuller's death in 1850.
Ironically, the friendship continued on as Emerson edited and wrote a literary tribute to Fuller, Memoirs of Margaret Fuller Ossoli (1851). Zwarg devotes
much space to a discussion of Emerson's manner of dealing with the text
and Fuller's death. When Fuller died, Emerson wrote "I have lost in her my
audience." He was deeply touched by her pathetic death. Fuller was en
route from Italy when her ship foundered off the coast of Fire Island. She,
her husband Giovanni Ossoli, and infant child Angelo were drowned. Emerson dispatched Henry Thoreau to the scene, but all that Thoreau could obtain was a button he ripped from a jacket he thought belonged to Ossoli.
In 1840, Fuller wrote about her relationship with Emerson: "His friendship
is only strong inference and he weights and balances, buys and sells you and
himself all the time. I love to keep the flower shut till my breeze and then
open its blushful bloom to the friend alone. He would wait till esteem was
challenged. I till the chain of affinity vibrated" (Jan 22, 1840). The metaphor
here has a sexual undertone. Zwarg thinks that the relationship was platonic,
but she makes the point that there was always something in it that kept
Emerson on edge. She mentions (several times) that Emerson had a sense of
panic when learning that some of Fuller's personal letters had been found
washed ashore after the shipwreck. Actually, Fuller had secured their correspondence with a friend in Italy. But Emerson sensed that his freedom of
expression might embarrass him.
Fuller generally looks away from America as a source of literature. Her
writings are peppered with quotations and references to the Europeans and
classical mythology; less frequently is an American author, except for Emerson, used as a resource. Notations by commentators busily explain references
that prove Fuller's wide range and extensive knowledge of the classics and
European literature, but references to American authors dealing with American themes are less frequent, and she tends to dismiss them. Europe was
Fuller's Mecca. She looked East across the Atlantic even when she toured the
prairies of Illinois and described them in Slimmer 011 the Lakes (1844), recording <I trip along the Great Lakes from Buffalo to Chicago and the prairies beyond. Fuller liked the prairies best. Because this is one of Fuller's full-scale
published works, it is treated with a seriousness that it probably does not
dcscrn?, SUlIllller is not good travel literature and generally lacks a sense of
pbcc. Fuller's complaint that Washington Irving's descriptions of the region
"lack brc<1th and glow, the charming minute traits of living presence," <lpply
more sc\'crcly to Fuiter's own text. Zwarg emphasizes the American aspects
of SUlIJ/J/t'r <lnd makes it seem a better book than it probably is by reading it
as lin eXJ.mplc of the double strategy, story and feminist argument. The
thel11eS for her book tell it <III: the hardship and isolation of women in the
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new communities, cultural dullness, the generally negative influence of commerce on character, the contrast of Indian life before European settlement
and its present squalid condition. There aTe some scenes in which Fuller informs the reader of what she sees and feels, but I suspect that the natural
scene never charged Fuller's imagination. During the trip, she was always
thinking and making connections for revising "The Great Lawsuit: Man versus Men" which was to be published in the July 1843 issue of Dial.
It's my guess that Fuller's talk about her summer on the lakes was much
more enlivening and dynamic than what she wrote. Summer on the Lakes begins at Niagara Falls where Fuller seems to have worked hard to register the
feeling of awe associated with a scene of natural sublimity. In the end, Fuller
decided that the rapids below the falls in moonlight best satisfied her romantic spirit. nus is backward, until you accept the possibility that Fuller was
not thrilled with the whole episode. Summer on the Lakes is not in the same
league as Harriet Martineau's Society in America (1837) which Fuller strongly
criticized because Martineau criticized Transcendentalism as being faddish
and called Boston the headquarters of cant. Zwarg suggests that Fuller's reaction to Niagara Falls is a textbook esthetic experience (wonder followed by
awe). But she thinks that Fuller feminized the experience by recalling the
dread of Indians attacking defenseless women. Zwarg links Fuller's vision of
awe with the subject of John Vanderlyn's painting "The Death of Jane McCrea" (1804). This is a good match-up, but given Fuller's penchant for elaboration, one wonders if she invented this vision during the' writing process.
Zwarg is too kind to Fuller's Summer, though she is closest to the mark, I
think, when she points out that "nearly a third of the work is a lengthy description of her reading during her trip and later, as she was composing the
narrative." (102) In fact, Fuller did much post-trip reading for her travel
book in the Harvard Library. Joan Von Mehren notes that Fuller was the first
woman to be granted the privilege of using the library and that the sight of a
woman in the reading room must have been shocking to the male students.
Fuller's public speaking, unlike Emerson's, was conducted largely behind
closed doors. Fuller's "Conversation" conducted for the women of her circle
in Boston and Cambridge were never published. They were for women only,
and only one "Conversation" permitted men to attend. The "Conversations"
seem to have been attempts at participatory lectures: Fuller would discourse
on a selected topic, and then, having inspired her audience, she would try to
engage them in a dialog. The conversations were conducted between 18411844. Even Emerson, who praised her writing, thought that "her powers of
speech throw her writing into the shade." On the other hand, Horace Greeley thought very highly of Fuller's writing, and after the publication of Summer, he signed her to a contract as critic and cultural columnist, which
continued when Fuller traveled in Europe from 1846-1850.
Zwarg's study is concerned with giving Fuller her due and reevaluating
her contribution to the culture and letters of her time and the present. Fuller
is not a marginal figure, and Zwarg tries to understand Fuller as a feminist
and conventional critic. She has succeeded, and in the process has written at
least MO books in one: a text that is feminist and a scholarly apparatus that
is conventional. The MO books coalesce largely thanks to an inspired deci-
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sian to place the footnotes, which are succinct and helpful, at the bottom of
each page.
This study is more about Fuller and less about Emerson. One of Zwarg's
aims is to persuasively demonstrate Fuller's "mutually empowering, and interactive" literary relationship with Emerson. Was Fuller merely Emerson's
Muse, or was she Emerson's Minerva? Without providing a definitive answer, Zwarg explains that Fuller was both, and the rest I leave the reader of
her study to untangle. Emerson looms large throughout. Ironically, Zwarg
gives him the last word. The last section of the text is a discussion of the
Memoirs of Margaret Fuller Ossoli which Emerson edited and to which he
wrote a major piece. It was his way of making his peace with Fuller and
mourning her death. It was also an attempt at securing Fuller's reputation
and laying to rest the scandal of her romance with Ossoli: "Emerson discovered that the audience for his projected Memoirs was rather suspicious of
Fuller's liberation in Italy and grateful that she failed to liberate the United
States in the same fashion. The recovery of her liberating powers, which
Emerson believed in, given his sense of the intellectual crisis in America,
was complicated by the culture's reading of those powers as merely erotic,
echoing in a vulgar ",ay his own sense of their potential efficacy" (240).
Zwarg also shows' that Emerson's "Woman" (a lecture before the Boston
Woman's Rights Convention 1855) and the essay "Fate" (published in 1860)
were composed with Fuller in mind. The process by which Emerson combined his sense of loss and composed his own work is neatly developed by
Zwarg, and she makes a strong case for accepting that here especially Fuller's "life becomes integral to the figurative play and historical intervention
of his work" (240). Zwarg shows how Fuller influenced Emerson as a person
in conversation and as muse for his creative writing. Her final example
adroitly points this out. In his journals, Emerson wrote, "A personal influence towers up in memory the only worthy force when we would gladly forget numbers or money or climate, gravitation & the rest of Fate. Margaret,
whenever she came, fused people into society, & a glOWing company was
the result. When I think how few persons can do that feat for the intellectual
class, I feel our squalid poverty" (294). When he finished "Fate," this passage
became less personal and more universal and conventional: "Only one way
is right to go; the hero sees it, and moves on that aim, and the world under
him for root and support." Zwarg's point is that the shift in wording, making Margaret a universal hero, is evidence of Emerson's advocacy of Fuller.
Zwarg wonders how many of Emerson's readers would recognize the veiled
reference to Fuller. How many modern readers make the connection? Herein
lies part of the problem of defining Fuller's influence. It is not easily or immediately recognized and must be demonstrated. This is a task that is worth

~~
Zwarg is on sure ground when she discusses Fuller's influence on Emerson's Second Series (1844). She is kind to Emerson's feminist perspective and
thinks that "his uneasiness looks considerably more alluring when we consider the range of issues at hand in the project of defining a feminist perspective for the conduct of life." (128) The light of mutual influence is brightest
betvveen Second Series and Woman in the Nineteenth Century, and she thinks
that in the Second Series, Emerson consciously used Fuller as a shaping figure
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and Charles Fourier, the social reformer, as the catalyst (132). In their discussions of the problem of marriage and social reform, Fuller and Emerson accepted Fourier's contention that society is degraded by demeaning women
through the patriarchal structure. At the time both read and studied Fourier,
Fuller and Emerson grew unexpectedly close partly as the result of the death
of Emerson's brother Charles and after the death of his son Waldo. Zwarg
thinks that Emerson's grief brought hiIn to consider Fourier's idea that reasserting the original "paSSionate attractions" in human nature one can thwart
social prejudice and reform. The confluence of influences led Emerson,
Zwarg contends, to be susceptible to Fuller's argu1l1ents, particularly in his
advocacy of the rights of women.
Zwarg says that Fuller "initiates her 'feminism' through her readingwhich is to say, through the activity of translation and literary criticism,
shifting only then to a theory of history as an act of reading ... " (8). Zwarg
complains, wrongly I think, that Bell Cale Chevigny's The Woman and the
Myth (1976) is old-fashioned literary criticism and is not feminist enough. On
the other hand, what is one to make of Zwarg's attempt at contemporary
criticism when she states that "The ensemble we call Fuller (her life and
work) reads like an indecipherable text because she participated in its production"? Fortunately, Zwarg makes sense of Fuller's texts, though she might
have given more information about Fuller's life-information that is available in several recent biographies particularly Charles Capper's Margaret
Fuller, American Romantic (1992) and Joan Von Mehren's Minerva and the
lvlouse (1994). Zwarg's concern is to show that Fuller meant to provide a radical theory of feminisln through all of her reading and writing and that this
"provides a clue to her Significance for our understanding of Emerson's development and theoretical foundations of feminist criticism today." (8) Is
Zwarg felninist enough? Is Fuller feminist enough? I think that the answer to
both is yes.

Pace University

Walter Levy

